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1 
IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE ABOUT 
BABIES: THE TASTE FOR 
HETEROSEXUALITY AND ITS 
CONSPICUOUS REPRODUCTION 
José Gabilondo* 
Abstract: This article targets a flying buttress of normative heterosexu-
ality: its physical reproduction via procreation and its symbolic propaga-
tion through parents’ pre-natal preferences for heterosexuality in future 
children. While the parental “taste for heterosexuality” is often asserted 
for the sake of future children themselves, this justification overlooks 
the role of parental self-interest, including anticipated social gains to 
parents from heterosexuality in children. Hence the taste sets the stage 
both for sexual orientation-based abuse of future children and the de-
valuation of sexual minority adults. Courts too have a taste for hetero-
sexuality, shown here in two state court cases denying gays and lesbians 
the right to marry. These courts hold that homosexuals reproduce de-
liberately while heterosexuals may do so recklessly, leading the courts to 
conclude that only heterosexuals require marriage to ensure stable homes 
for children. These decisions “subsidize” normative heterosexuality and 
its reproduction by conferring symbolic capital on both. Apart from the 
burdens it places on sexual minorities, this symbolic privilege comes at a 
cost to heterosexuals and children alike. By privileging the reproduc-
tion of normative heterosexuality, this symbolic economy discourages 
heterosexuals from fully appreciating the long-term consequences of re-
production. This economy also gives them a pretext for avoiding life-
style competition with homosexual parents, to the detriment of children 
who might benefit from the improved parenting technique that such 
competition would encourage. 
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Introduction 
 People have babies for many reasons and sometimes for no ap-
parent reason at all. We tend to celebrate having babies with equal 
zeal, though, regardless of whether the baby is intended or accidental. 
Indeed, we celebrate even the abstract idea of having babies. Econo-
mist Gary Becker introduced an economic model to explain why het-
erosexuals, in particular, have babies. He suggests that babies, like 
other commodities, give their parents “income” in the broad sense in 
which economists use that term.1 He asserts that, just as with other 
commodities, the number and type of children one has are functions 
of the would-be parent’s “tastes.”2 
                                                                                                                      
1 Gary S. Becker, An Economic Analysis of Fertility, in Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries 209, 209–40 (1960) 
[hereinafter Becker, Fertility]; Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family 138 (1991) 
[hereinafter Becker, Family]; see also Bernard M. S. Van Praag & Marcel F. Warnaar, The 
Costs of Children and the Use of Demographic Variables in Consumer Demand, in 1A Handbook of 
Population and Family Economics 241, 245–50 (Mark Rosenzweig & Oded Stark eds., 
1997) (summarizing alternative methods of estimating the costs of children). 
2 Becker, Fertility, supra note 1, at 211. Becker notes that ultimately it is personal (and 
class) taste that determines the demand for children: “The utility from children is com-
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 Putting to one side the morality of thinking about human life in 
the instrumental terms which Becker attributes to parents, Becker’s 
view that reproduction is a lifestyle choice helps illustrate how market 
dynamics bear on reproduction and, in particular, on parental prefer-
ences about outcomes in children.3 One place to see such reproduc-
tive tastes at work is in the over-the-counter markets for babies that 
legal and business scholars have noted.4 These “baby markets” reflect 
a wide range of parental tastes, including the race discount which 
Michele Goodwin has noted in the adoption market.5 
 Might there also be a taste for heterosexuality in offspring, like 
the racialized taste addressed by Goodwin? Indeed. It is my conten-
tion that some heterosexual would-be parents apply a “gay discount” 
or a “straight premium” when thinking about future children and that 
the prospect of capturing social approval through the anticipated 
heterosexuality of children encourages reproduction. In other words, 
                                                                                                                      
pared with that from other goods via . . . a set of indifference curves. The shape of the 
indifference curves is determined by the relative preference for children, or, in other 
words, by ‘tastes.’” Id. 
3 For example, Becker suggests that “[t]he net cost of children is reduced if they con-
tribute to family income by performing household chores, working in the family business, 
or working in the marketplace.” Becker, Family, supra note 1, at 138–39. Then an in-
crease in the “earning” potential of children would increase the demand for children. See 
id. 
4 See, e.g., Debora L. Spar, The Baby Business: How Money, Science, and Politics 
Drive the Commerce of Conception, at xi (2006) (describing the market structure for 
realizing would-be parents’ prenatal preferences for offspring); Martha M. Ertman, What’s 
Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. 
Rev. 1, 7, 35 (2003) (arguing that market operations in parenthood may contribute to self-
realization by sexual minorities, and noting that “[a]cademic hand wringing about 
whether selling parenthood would be a good thing implies that we do not already buy and 
sell it. But the practice is alive and well in various guises, direct and indirect.”); Michele 
Goodwin, The Free-Market Approach to Adoption: The Value of a Baby, 26 B.C. Third World 
L.J. 61, 62 (2006) (documenting the existence of market valuation—and a race discount 
for children—in the adoption market). 
5 See Goodwin, supra note 4, at 66–69. Goodwin observes that: 
[D]irectly and indirectly, market forces or economic considerations influence 
adoptions . . . . Conventional wisdom and early legislation held the best inter-
est of children at the center of all adoptions . . . . Contemporary adoption 
services, however, resemble free markets where aesthetic profiles of race, hair 
texture, eye color and other market variables determine the welfare of chil-
dren or, at least, their likelihood of placement. 
Id. at 62. Specifically, Goodwin points out that black infants may be adopted for only $4000 
while the costs of adopting a similar white infant can exceed $50,000. Id. at 67; see also 
Ruthann Robson, Our Children: Kids of Queer Parents & Kids Who Are Queer: Looking at Sexual 
Minority Rights from a Different Perspective, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 915, 932–36 (2001) (discussing 
parental efforts to impose heterosexuality upon their children). 
4 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 28:1 
for some, the demand for children involves a demand for heterosexu-
ality and its symbolic pay off of social approval. There is nothing natu-
ral about this straight premium; its value gets soft-wired through cul-
tural conditioning as reinforced by legal and economic rewards. This 
article supports these claims and examines their implications.6 
 Although the trend in baby markets is towards accommodating 
would-be parents’ commodity preferences about children, pre-implan-
tation genetic determination of sexual orientation has yet to develop, 
and data is not yet available about how sexual minority children fare in 
adoption markets.7 Therefore one must look elsewhere for information 
about any prenatal preferences for heterosexuality. One way to observe 
a straight premium is to see how much people would “pay” for the trait 
of heterosexuality in their kids in what is called a “when-, if-, and as-
issued market” —one in which buyers and sellers price a forthcoming 
asset.8 I informally simulate such a pricing environment in a game that 
I made up for use in our school’s “Women and the Law” course. The 
game simulates an auction in which I am the auctioneer and the stu-
dents are “purchasers” who must choose between alternative trade-offs 
in their future children. The game encourages bidders to make their 
                                                                                                                      
6 Because differences in the reproductive economies and legal standing between ho-
mosexuals and heterosexuals exist, substantive consideration of homosexual reproduction 
requires a separate analysis, beyond the scope of this article. Heterosexuals and homo-
sexuals face different reproductive economies because heterosexuals may choose between 
coital or other means of reproduction and because homosexuals face legal hurdles as well. 
Gary J. Gates, et al., Adoption and Foster Care by Gay and Lesbian Parents in the 
United States 3 (Mar. 2007), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411437_Adoption_ 
Foster_Care.pdf (summarizing state law restrictions on adoption and fostering by gays, 
lesbians, and bisexuals). For example, legal obstacles to reproduction—including obstacles 
such as the Florida statute providing that “[n]o person eligible to adopt under this statute 
may adopt if that person is a homosexual” —can place substantial barriers in the way of 
homosexual would-be parents. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.042(3) (2005). 
7 See Spar, supra note 4, at 99–100, 118–27. Spar notes the initial resistance to facing 
up to parents’ commodity preferences about their children: 
As people—as parents—we don’t like to think of children as economic ob-
jects. They are products, we insist, of love, not money; of an intimate creation 
that exists far beyond the reach of any market impulse. And yet, over the past 
thirty years, advances in reproductive medicine have indeed created a market 
for babies, a market in which parents choose traits, clinics woo clients, and 
specialized providers earn millions of dollars a year. 
Id. at xi. 
8 For example, in the context of the U.S. government securities market, the “when is-
sued” market “occurs during the period between the time a new Treasury issue is an-
nounced and the time it is actually issued.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-722, pt. 1, at 12 (1992). 
What a government security trades for in the “when issued” market suggests what its price 
will be when it is actually issued. 
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preferences explicit and precisely quantified. To test for the gay dis-
count, I use heterosexuality in offspring as a unit of account to measure 
competing trade-offs in offspring. 
 Round one: I announce what is going to be priced— “Would you 
rather have a gay baby or a straight one missing a ______?” The bidding 
starts with the extremities, which are divisible and easy to compare. I 
ask whether the players would—all else being equal—prefer a straight 
baby missing a small toe over a gay one with ten toes. Eventually, a 
player will say: “Well, who needs two little toes?” Then I make hetero-
sexuality more “expensive” by removing enough of the straight baby’s 
toes until the players prefer the gay one. I next look for the price points 
against what are commonly perceived to be other reproductive trade-
offs, for example, sterility, ugliness, cleft-lip, and blindness or deafness 
(in one eye or ear, first, and then in both). 
 It was the pattern of price points that caught my attention. An op-
posable thumb seemed to be a price point; a mere pinkie, like a small 
toe, was not. So it seemed that some people had a “taste” for straight 
children and that the taste was elastic, in that it would yield if the price 
were right, for example, a thumb. Don’t take my word for any of this. 
The auction makes a good party game, so play it in the company of 
friends. 
 People may distance themselves from responsibility for the taste 
by saying: “It’s for the child’s sake, not my own.” Given what players 
might be willing to inflict on future children for their sake, though, 
the auction left me wondering about the meaning of this preference: 
could it lend legitimacy to devaluing existing homosexuals? And does 
the taste suggest that the prospect of social approval plays an impor-
tant role in one’s demand for children? Despite the tentativeness of 
empirical data on these claims, my answer to both questions is “yes.” I 
wrote this article to expose these claims to scholarly contestation or 
affirmation. Granted, we know little about the meaning of pregnancy 
to individuals, so appreciating this nuance may be out of the question 
until our general knowledge about pregnancy grows.9 For example, 
many people seem not to appreciate the actual costs which are associ-
                                                                                                                      
9 It is even difficult to measure females’ intentions about reproduction—intentions 
that are themselves highly variable. See, e.g., John Santelli et al., The Measurement and Mean-
ing of Unintended Pregnancy, 35 Persp. on Sexual & Reprod. Health 94 (2003) (noting 
problems such as the limited usefulness of retrospective measures of intent to reproduce, 
the need to adjust research approaches used for aggregate data to the individual level, and 
the importance of taking into account the preferences of the male partner). 
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ated with having a baby.10 So, as with other pricing anomalies, I am 
less “bullish” about reproduction as an abstract concept, as suggested 
by the title’s paraphrase of former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan’s warning about “irrational exuberance” (leading to over-
investment) in a rising stock market.11 
 The taste shows up in law too, including two recent state court 
decisions which this article examines.12 These cases exclude homo-
sexuals from marriage because of that institution’s supposed special 
role in helping heterosexuals mitigate the unintended effects of their 
coitus.13 In Morrison v. Sadler, the Indiana Court of Appeals claimed 
that heterosexuals needed marriage to procreate “responsibly” and to 
avoid “child abuse, educational failure, and poverty.”14 In Hernandez v. 
Robles, New York’s Court of Appeals followed a similar rationale.15 In 
effect, the court proposed that the New York legislature could bribe 
                                                                                                                      
10 As an example, you may have heard jokes about the “$250,000 baby” but the costs of 
a baby vary significantly by class, as reflected in the U. S. Department of Agriculture’s an-
nual report on expenditures by families on children. Ctr. for Nutrition Pol’y Promo-
tion, U.S. Dept. Agric., Expenditures on Children by Families, 2005, at 13 (2005), 
available at http://www.cnpp.usda.gov/Publications/CRC/crc2005.pdf. The study divides 
children born in 2005 into three income groups and estimates annual expenses from birth 
through age seventeen. Not adjusted for the time-value of money and rounding to thou-
sands, the estimates are: $183,000 for the lowest income families, $251,000 for middle 
income families, and $366,000 for the highest income families. Id. 
11 See Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Fed. Reserve Bank, Remarks at the Annual 
Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, (Dec. 5, 1996) (“But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly 
escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contrac-
tions as they have in Japan over the past decade?”). 
12 See infra notes 75–183 and accompanying text. 
13 See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 25 n.13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Hernandez v. 
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006). 
14 821 N.E.2d at 24 n.11, 25. The court understands “responsible procreation” to mean 
“the procreation and raising of children by persons who have contemplated, and are well-
suited for, the required commitment and challenges of child-rearing. . . . Opposite-sex 
couples who can reproduce ‘naturally’ need not, and often do not, engage in such con-
templation before having intercourse.” Id. at 25 n.13. 
15 855 N.E.2d at 7. It is not a pretty picture: “The Legislature could also find that [het-
erosexual] relationships are all too often casual or temporary. . . . The Legislature could 
find that unstable relationships between people of the opposite sex present a greater dan-
ger that children will be born into or grow up in unstable homes than is the case with 
same-sex couples . . . .” Id. (rejecting state equal protection and due process arguments 
that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage violates New York’s constitution); see 
also Yvonne A. Tamayo, “I Just Can’t Handle It”: The Case of Hernandez v. Robles, 28 
Women's Rts. L. Rep. 61, 64 (2007) (analyzing Hernandez as an exercise of heteronorma-
tive judicial dominance). 
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heterosexuals into getting their impulses under control for the sake of 
their children.16 It is pure alchemy. 
 Courts invent many reasons for excluding homosexuals from mar-
riage, but in these cases it is the carelessness of heterosexuals which 
founds their title to the institution. Statistics on unintended pregnancy 
and abortion vindicate the factual predicate for these holdings.17 But 
what struck me about these cases—apart from their cheekiness—was 
how each took reckless coitus as a fact of heterosexual life, a fact which 
justified the special rights of marriage.18 This is what humanities 
scholar Lee Edelman has wryly called heterosexuality’s “Ponzi scheme 
of reproductive futurism,” an analogy which suggests that parents may 
not fully appreciate what drives them to reproduce until it is too late to 
do anything about it.19 
                                                                                                                      
16 See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7. 
17 See Guttmacher Inst., Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States 
(2006), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html. About half of each 
year’s roughly six million pregnancies in the United States are unintended. Am. Preg-
nancy Ass’n, Statistics, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/main/statistics.html (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2008) (citing six million figure); Guttmacher Inst., supra (citing Law-
rence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Disparities in Rates of Unintended Pregnancy in the United 
States, 1994 and 2001, 38 Persp. on Sexual & Reproductive Health 90–96 (2006)). Ac-
cording to some estimates, as many as forty percent of these unintended pregnancies are 
terminated by abortion. Guttmacher Inst., supra. For 2003, the Centers for Disease Con-
trol recorded over eight hundred thousand legal abortions which had been reported vol-
untarily by health authorities. Lilo T. Strauss et al., U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control, 
Abortion Surveillance—United States, 2003 (2006), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ 
preview/mmwrhtml/ss5511a1.htm. The actual number is no doubt higher given incentives 
not to report and the availability of illegal abortions. See Nat’l Right to Life Comm., 
Over 40 Million Abortions in U.S. Since 1973, http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/abor- 
amt.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). The actual figure may be closer to the 1,328,000 used 
as the standing annual estimate by the National Right to Life Committee. See id. For 2004, 
the number of live births was about four million, as measured by birth certificates issued. 
U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control, Births: Final Data for 2004, 55 Nat’l Vital Stat. Rep. 1, 
2 (2006). Research suggests that at least one-third of all live births result from unintended 
pregnancies. See U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control, Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring 
System (PRAMS): PRAMS and Unintended Pregnancy, http://www.cdc.gov/PRAMS/UP. 
htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). 
18 See Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 30–31; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7. 
19 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive 4 (2004). Lee 
Edelman takes the credit for introducing this useful phrase in his polemic against repro-
duction. Id. (“[W]e might do well to attempt what is surely impossible—to withdraw our 
allegiance, however compulsory, from a reality based on the Ponzi scheme of reproductive 
futurism . . . .”). A Ponzi scheme is a venture which funds payments to current investors 
using the proceeds of new investors rather than from operating profits of the venture. 
Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals from 
Enron to Reform 23–25 (2006) (describing Charles Ponzi’s original fraud using postal 
coupons). The arrangement creates an illusion of profit from what is really just recycling 
of new capital. Id. 
8 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 28:1 
 There is no accounting for taste or its reproduction, granted, but 
let me try nonetheless. Katherine Bartlett has noted about feminist 
methods that a question repeated becomes a method.20 That is the hope 
of this article, that it be an example of “situated theory” —written as a 
system outsider, despite owing my own existence to heterosexual coitus, 
and demonstrating that the taste for heterosexuality reflects an inap-
propriate over-valuation of heterosexuality and its reproduction.21 I 
may not persuade you of these claims; it is enough that you take them 
seriously. 
 Part I argues that the taste exists in the minds of would-be parents 
and in courts. First I relate the prenatal gay discount to existing critical 
and feminist scholarship about “heterosexual reproductivism.” It is an -ism 
not because it includes “existence-inducing acts”22 like coital and other 
forms of reproduction but because it privileges so-called “heterosexual 
complementarity” as a moral and legal rationale. I then show how Mor-
rison and Hernandez reflect and perpetuate a taste for heterosexuality 
when resolving the central dilemma each case presents: how to extol 
heterosexuality as a reproductive norm despite judicial declarations 
against interest about the social costs of heterosexual coitus. 
 After explaining these two manifestations of the taste—the paren-
tal one and the judicial one—Part II offers one explanation for what 
drives its reproduction, generation after generation. The argument 
about causation rests on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social reproduc-
tion, which explains individual action as a function of the pursuit of 
economic capital according to one’s taste.23 A whistle-blower on the 
elite, Bourdieu has an analytical model ideal for examining (and teas-
ing) the moneyed classes, whose reproductive projects often escape 
                                                                                                                      
20 Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 837 (1990) (“A 
question becomes a method when it is regularly asked.”). 
21 “Situated theory” is another way to refer to the way that Marxian theory locates the 
generation of theory itself in dynamic social processes which connect political aspirations 
with lived experience. See, e.g., Knowledge and Class: A Marxian Critique of Politi-
cal Economy 2 (Stephen A. Resnick & Richard D. Wolff eds., 1987) (“Marxian theory has 
a distinctive concept of what theory is . . . . Theory is a process in society. It comprises the 
production, deployment, and organization of concepts.”). Resistance to this type of dia-
logue is most likely to come from those with something to lose if the power to generate 
norms from their position was called into question: “The anxiety about engaged theory is 
particularly marked among those whose particularities formed the prior universal. What 
they face from this critique is not losing a dialogue but beginning one, a more equal and 
larger and inclusionary one.” Catherine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of 
the State, at xv–xvi (1989). 
22 The phrase belongs to Melinda Roberts. See generally Melinda A. Roberts, Present Du-
ties and Future Persons: When Are Existence-Inducing Acts Wrong? 14 L. & Phil. 297 (1995). 
23 See infra notes 185–205, 218–222 and accompanying text. 
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adequate scrutiny.24 Rules of the game like those suggested by Morrison 
and Hernandez establish the symbolic value of heterosexuality (and its 
reproduction) and facilitate social competition by gain-seeking parents 
through their offspring.25 In this social economy, the income return 
from a straight child exceeds that from a gay one, helping to keep 
Edelman’s Ponzi scheme in perpetual motion.26 
 Once the central argument has been stated, Part III considers 
some implications, mostly for heterosexuals.27 First, the prenatal taste 
for heterosexuality is a eugenic preference which may portend sexual 
orientation abuse by parents and other forms of “conceptual liquida-
tion” of homosexuals and other sexual minorities.28 Straight couples 
might be able to avoid complicity in such gender cleansing campaigns 
by taking some cues from same-sex couples. Unfortunately, though, 
Morrison and Hernandez (and other forms of law like them) help to 
keep heterosexuals in the dark about reproduction by giving them a 
                                                                                                                      
24 See infra notes 197–202 and accompanying text. 
25 See Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 30–31; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7. 
26 See Edelman, supra note 19, at 4. 
27 This article is the second in a research series on heterosexual subject formation, the 
scope of which was announced in the first article. José Gabilondo, Asking the Straight Ques-
tion: How to Come to Speech in Spite of Conceptual Liquidation as a Homosexual, 21 Wisc. 
Women’s L.J. 1, 29 (2006) (“[T]he point of critical heterosexual studies is to focus more 
closely and comprehensively on the relationship between heterosexuality and heteronor-
mativity with an eye to improving the quality and moral stature of heterosexuality.”). That 
article argued that academic scrutiny of these questions should be embedded in the study 
of heterosexuality rather than being sidelined to gay and lesbian or queer studies. Id. at 
29–31. This article expands on these themes by considering the relationship between het-
erosexuality and reproduction. The next piece in this series will examine the ways in which 
heterosexuality lets different fundamentalist religious sects overcome collective action 
problems in order to form multi-sectarian alliances that operate in globalized religious 
markets. 
28 See Glenda M. Russell, Voted Out: The Psychological Consequences of Anti-
Gay Politics 5 (2000) (analyzing the psychological impact on gay people of an amend-
ment to the Colorado Constitution that made antidiscrimination protections for sexual 
minorities unconstitutional). Conceptual liquidation is a totalizing strategy to erase an 
identity: 
[A] group is conceptually liquidated—or demolished in a culture’s thoughts— 
when its members are seen as less than human, as massively confused about the 
right order of things, and as lost in a hopeless cognitive and spiritual morass. . . . 
[There are] four steps in the process of the conceptual liquidation of LGBs 
[lesbians, gays, and bisexuals] by anti-gay campaigns. The first step involves por-
traying LGB people as a threat. Step two focuses on equating LBG orientation 
with pathology. The third step is the construction of an explanation for their 
orientations . . . . [The] final step is the social construction of a cure for the pre-
sumed pathology of LBG orientations. 
Id. at 5. 
10 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 28:1 
legal pretext to avoid constructive norm competition with homosex-
ual parents, from whom their straight counterparts could learn much. 
Second, and more generally, the symbolic and legal over-valuation of 
reproduction—of which the taste for heterosexuality is a lynchpin— 
leads many heterosexuals to regret reproduction after-the-fact. Femi-
nist economic methods might do a better job of helping heterosexu-
als to resist the gravitational pull of compulsory pregnancy. The sur-
face resemblance of this part of the argument to eugenics may raise 
hackles, so it is important to note that any such resemblance is illu-
sory. Eugenics advocates strategic reproduction based on racialized 
preferences, which is the furthest thing from my mind.29 
 Don’t get me wrong: I love straight people and children, and ba-
bies less so because they lack irony. It is just that my affinities extend 
only to those already in being. What alarms me is making—as Morri-
son and Hernandez do—the normative status of heterosexuality a social 
engineering project in need of legal subsidies. It is as though this ma-
jority orientation would perish but for our efforts on its behalf. It is 
the patterned unreflectiveness of heterosexual reproduction that 
concerns me most. Our moral clarity about racism and anti-Semitism 
may one day extend to marriage discrimination.30 While we wait, read 
on for a textual contraceptive against the propagation of normative 
heterosexuality.31 
                                                                                                                      
29 Eugenic programs brought together constituencies with widely divergent interests and 
ideologies. For example, in Switzerland, social reformer Auguste Forel promoted eugenics as 
part of a movement of “rational sexuality.” Natalia Gerodetti, From Science to Social Technology: 
Eugenics and Politics in Twentieth-Century Switzerland, 13 Soc. Pol.: Int’l Stud. in Gender, St. 
& Soc’y 59, 69–72 (2006) (analyzing the impact of Forel’s The Sexual Question on Swiss 
eugenic policies in the Swiss Criminal and Civil Codes). Gerodetti points out that the success 
of the eugenics movement in Switzerland lay in its comprehensive appeal to “conservative 
conceptions of sexuality as well as to social reformist and even feminist conceptions of sexual-
ity.” Id. at 82. 
30 See John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay 
People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Four-
teenth Century 6 (1980). 
As long as the religious beliefs which support a particular prejudice are gen-
erally held by a population, it is virtually impossible to separate the two [reli-
gious belief and prejudice]; once the beliefs are abandoned, the separation 
may be so complete that the original connection becomes all but incompre-
hensible. For example, it is now as much an article of faith in most European 
countries that Jews should not be oppressed because of their religious beliefs 
as it was in the fourteenth century that they should be. 
Id. 
31 Suzanna Danuta Walters, Threat Level Lavender: The Truthiness of Gay Marriage, 
Chron. Higher Educ. (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 19, 2007, at B12. The link between reproductive 
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I. Heterosexuality Offspring Preference 
 Given the animus visited on sexual minorities by judges, legislators, 
clerics, teachers, and, most poignantly, their own families, preferring 
that one’s child be straight may seem merely paternalistic.32 Let me 
convince you otherwise. Section A situates the parental taste for hetero-
sexuality in the context of critical legal and feminist scholarship and 
connects it to natalist policies in law. Moving from parents to courts, 
Section B analyzes how Morrison and Hernandez reflect the same taste in 
their legal reasoning. 
A. The Parental Taste for Heterosexuality and Its Reproduction 
 Michele Goodwin has shown how, in the adoption market, the ra-
cialized preferences of would-be parents “tier” children available for 
adoption by pricing them according to pigmentation and other racial 
features.33 Were the race of one’s own children more contingent, racial-
ized preferences might appear not only in secondary markets for chil-
dren—like adoption—but also in the primary birth market which is my 
focus.34 My specific contention is that, were heterosexuals to think it 
through, many would prefer heterosexuality to homosexuality in a 
                                                                                                                      
norms and the gay rights movement is too seldom made express. “The real lavender 
threat, perhaps symbolized by marriage but certainly not subsumed by it, is that gay kin-
ship, gay sexual frontiers, gay intimacies will disrupt heterosexual familialism.” Id. 
32 I recognize the difference between heterosexuality and heteronormativity, but until 
heterosexuals-at-large internalize and sustain this working distinction, it may be more ef-
fective to collapse the two, as some do. See Gabilondo, supra note 27, at 29. 
33 See Goodwin, supra note 4, at 66–69. 
The concept of a free market in children is rejected based on what it symbol-
izes, including its argued resemblance to slavery or the auction block. Yet, di-
rectly and indirectly, market forces or economic considerations influence 
adoptions in the United States to a greater extent than traditionally acknowl-
edged. . . . Contemporary adoption services, however, resemble free markets 
where aesthetic profiles of race, hair texture, eye color and other market vari-
ables determine the welfare of children or, at least, their likelihood of place-
ment. 
Id. at 62–63. 
34 The taste for heterosexuality is different from the race discount in that the former 
occurs routinely within the same racial group (which is not to suggest, of course, that the 
race discount never appears within the same racial group in the form of a preference for 
lighter-colored children). Were race more broadly contingent—in the sense that a white 
couple might be faced with having a black child—one would expect would-be parents to 
express racialized preferences similar to that for heterosexuality in children. 
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child.35 Indeed, the preference for heterosexual offspring may be so 
great as to trump the taste for “own children” that Gary Becker’s work 
on the socioeconomics of the family posits as the “distinguishing char-
acteristic of families.”36 Ruthann Robson points out Richard Posner’s 
casual recognition of parental preferences in existing children and his 
seeming hope that science will manage to eradicate homosexuality in 
the future when she quotes him directly: 
Maybe we should just be patient; science, which has worked 
so many wonders, may someday, perhaps someday soon, dis-
cover a “cure” for homosexuality . . . . [I]f the hypothetical 
cure for homosexuality were something that could be ad-
ministered—costlessly, risklessly, without side effects—before 
a child had become aware of his homosexual propensity, you 
can be sure that the child’s parents would administer it to 
him, believing, probably correctly, that he would be better 
off, not yet having assumed a homosexual identity.37 
                                                                                                                      
35 See generally Juan Battle & Michael Bennett, Research on Lesbian and Gay Populations 
Within the African American Community: What Have We Learned? 6 Afr. Am. Res. Persp. 35 
(2000) (summarizing research examining the extent and dynamic of homophobia in the 
African-American community). This article invites any would-be parent to consider the 
role of his or her own preferences on this matter. The justification asserted in polite com-
pany for the preference—concern for a future child’s prospects in a straight-preferenced 
world—assumes and relies upon exactly that which it is intended to substantiate. 
36 See Becker, Family, supra note 1, at 45 (“One could postulate a ‘taste for own chil-
dren,’ which is no less (and no more) profound than postulating a taste for good food or for 
any commodity entering utility functions. Fortunately, the demand for own children, the 
distinguishing characteristic of families, need not be postulated but can be derived.”). Becker 
explains this socially-valued narcissism as a savings in information costs from sharing genes— 
because one knows the “intrinsic characteristics” of one’s own children, they are less risky 
than alien babies. Id. Belief in the value of genetic self-interest may flow as much from sociali-
zation as from any “natural” inclination to favor the reproduction of one’s genes, so narra-
tives about genetic affinity deserve the kind of critical analysis underway about evolution. See 
generally Misia Landau, Narratives of Human Evolution (1991) (applying Vladimir 
Propp’s theory about the morphology of folk-tales to identify the narrative structure of scien-
tific accounts of evolution); Melanie G. Wiber, Erect Men Undulating Women: The Vis-
ual Imagery of Gender, “Race” and Progress in Reconstructive Illustrations of 
Human Evolution (1997) (analyzing how illustrations about evolution reflect contempo-
rary assumptions about race and gender). 
37 Ruthann Robson, Sappho Goes to Law School 202 (1998) (quoting Richard A. 
Posner, Sex and Reason 308 (1992)). Robson draws attention to Posner’s comments as 
part of her analysis of his economic commentary on lesbians. Pharmaceutical companies 
might find more lucrative the development of a cure for coercive normativity in hetero-
sexuals, for which there is a much greater need than for a supposed “cure” addressed to 
stray sexual minority children. See id. 
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 Again, my premise is that the preference Posner mentions pre-
cedes birth and, indeed, creates demand for reproduction by holding 
out the promise of social approval and the enhanced status that comes 
from being a parent. Admittedly, little social science research exists on 
parents’ prenatal preferences as to the sexual orientation of their off-
spring.38 That is one reason why the Introduction asked the reader to 
do some basic research in his or her own social milieu. Another way of 
testing my hypothesis would be to ask prospective parents some version 
of the following: “Assume that you are genetically capable of producing 
only homosexual children. How would such a condition influence your 
interest in having a baby?”39 In any event, this data gap is predicted by 
Catharine MacKinnon when she points out that organized social domi-
nance can make some social facts seem so “natural” that they never be-
come the object of methodological inquiry in research or criticism.40 
The auction, anecdotal conversations, and the anthropology of every-
day life are enough to convince me. 
 A consensus of other legal scholars on post-natal preferences for 
heterosexuality also supports my assertion—both directly and by impli-
cation. For example, Robson has recognized the harm which post-natal 
preferences for heterosexuality on the part of heterosexual parents can 
visit on sexual minority children.41 She notes that “[w]hether conserva-
tives proceed from an essentialist (biological and immutable) basis for 
sexuality, a constructionist (psychological and environmental) basis for 
                                                                                                                      
38 No social science research of which I am aware links a would-be parent’s prenatal 
demand for children with preferences about the sexual orientation of offspring. The rela-
tionship between the two is suggested, though, in two of twenty-five questions included in a 
survey instrument used to measure homophobia: “I would feel that I had failed as a parent 
if I learned that my child was gay” and “I would feel disappointed if I learned that my child 
was homosexual.” Wendell A. Ricketts & Walter W. Hudson, Index of Homophobia, reprinted 
in Clive M. Davis et al., Handbook of Sexuality-Related Measures 367–68 (1998). 
39 The question can also be modified to test for gender preferences by clarifying that 
all males born would be “sissies” and all females would be “stone butch” tots. 
40 See MacKinnon, supra note 21, at 106. The lack of methods to study heterosexuality 
is another expression of the power of knowledge production that MacKinnon associates 
with the liberal state: 
Method organizes the apprehension of truth. It determines what counts as evi-
dence and defines what is taken as verification. Operatively, it determines what 
a theory takes to be real. . . . [M]ethod in this broader sense—approaches to 
searching for and apprehending the real—both produces and proceeds from 
substantive conclusions on questions like relevance (what questions count? what 
evidence supports answers?), structure (what is connected with what, and 
how?), and reliability (when is information worthy of belief?). 
Id. 
41 See Robson, supra note 5, at 932–48. 
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sexuality, or some combination of the two, the message is one of exclu-
sion and hostility.”42 Teemu Ruskola, Karolyn Ann Hicks, Devon Car-
bado, and Sonia Renee Martin, among others, have also criticized the 
post-natal manifestations of heterosexual offspring preference.43 In the 
same vein, Eve Kosovsky Sedgewick has pointedly addressed the risks to 
sexual minority children from parental enforcement of heterosexual-
ity.44 And heterosexuality offspring preference is, in the mind of a 
would-be parent, the prenatal manifestation of the “compulsory het-
erosexuality” that Adrienne Rich observed.45 
 The prenatal taste for heterosexuality is also an implication of the 
“straight mind” theorized by Monique Wittig in 1978.46 So too Michael 
Warner has noted how normative heterosexuality crowds out all other 
conceptions of the social and sexual order.47 Advocates of reparative 
                                                                                                                      
42 Id. at 932 (citation omitted). 
43 Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 76, 120 
(2000) (“The parents of heterosexuals do not love them “in spite of” their exual orienta-
tion, and parents do not blame themselves for their children’s herterosexuality.” (citation 
omitted)); Karolyn Ann Hicks, “Reparative” Therapy: Whether Parental Attempts to Change a 
Child’s Sexual Orientation Can Legally Constitute Child Abuse, 49 Am. U. L. Rev. 505, 534 
(1999) (“[A] court ruling or legislative interpretation that “reparative” thereapy is a form 
of child abuse, or more likely a form of neglect, would be constitutional because the child 
abuse and neglect laws that a court would interpret are passed for the protection of chil-
dren and society.” (citation omitted)); Sonia Renee Martin, Note, A Child’s Right to Be Gay: 
Addressing the Emotional Mistreatment of Queer Youth, 48 Hastings L.J. 167, 192 (1996) (“The 
state does not have an interest in protecting parents’ rights to ensure that their children 
are heterosexual, especially when it is clear that a significant proportion of the children in 
our society will not grow to be heterosexual adults. In contrast, the state has a great inter-
est in ensuring the emotional, and thereby physical, health and safety of children.”); 
Teemu Ruskola, Minor Disregard: The Legal Construction of the Fantasy That Gay and Lesbian 
Youth Do Not Exist, 8 Yale J.L. & Feminism 269, 285 (1996) (“The fantasy and wish that gay 
people not exist imbues every major institution of our culture. Law plays a central, al-
though not independent, role in the construction and regulation of homosexuality.”). 
44 See generally Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick, How to Bring Your Kids Up Gay, 29 Soc. Text 18 
(1991). 
45 See generally Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 Signs 
631 (1980). 
46 See Monique Wittig, The Straight Mind, in The Straight Mind and Other Essays 
27 (1992). Addressing the symbolic composition and imposition of hetero, Wittig writes: 
“In spite of the historic advent of the lesbian, feminist, and gay liberation movements, 
whose proceedings have already upset the philosophical and political categories of the 
discourses of the social sciences, [heteronormativity continues to] function like primitive 
concepts in a conglomerate of all kinds of disciplines, theories, and current ideas that I 
will call the straight mind.” Id. 
47 See Michael Warner, Introduction to Fear of a Queer Planet, at xxi (Michael War-
ner, ed. 1993). This is a corollary of Michael Warner’s observation that: “Het[erosexual] 
culture thinks of itself as the elemental form of human association, as the very model of 
inter-gender relations, as the indivisible basis of all community, and as the means of repro-
duction without which society wouldn’t exist.” Id. 
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therapy for homosexuals, like Dr. Joseph Nicolosi, would no doubt 
agree, as suggested by his guide for parents on preventing homosexual-
ity in (existing) children.48 What this article adds to these research clus-
ters is the contention that part of what precipitates these post-natal 
manifestations begins long before the birth of any child and, relatedly, 
that the prospect of increasing one’s social approval by producing 
“more” heterosexuality contributes to demand for children. 
 No discussion about the normative value of reproduction would be 
complete without entering the thicket of disagreement between Kathe-
rine Franke and Mary Becker on that subject. As I try to do in this arti-
cle, Katherine Franke has urged feminists to think more critically about 
“repronormative forces.”49 Claiming that some forms of feminism have 
cabined female sexuality through maternalist debates about mother-
hood and dependency, Franke objects to the way in which “legal femi-
nists have ceded to queer theorists the job of imagining the female 
body as a site of pleasure, intimacy, and erotic possibility.”50 Though 
aligned with much of Franke’s project, I have two objections. First, she 
defers too quickly to the phantom fear of extinction which is often used 
to justify natalism.51 My instinct would be to interrogate even the 
                                                                                                                      
48 See generally Joseph Nicolosi & Linda Ames Nicolosi, A Parent’s Guide to Pre-
venting Homosexuality (2002). Dr. Nicolosi notes: “As one prominent psychoanalyst, 
Dr. Charles Socarides, says, ‘Nowhere do parents say, “It makes no difference to me if my 
child is homosexual or heterosexual.’’’ Given a choice, most parents would prefer that 
their children not find themselves involved in homosexual behavior.” Id. at 12. Dr. Nicolosi 
is president of the National Association of Research and Therapy of Homosexuality 
(NARTH) and the author of numerous books on reparative therapy. Homosexuality: Cur-
rent Trends in Research and Therapy, http://www.narth.com/docs/2003conference.html 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2008). He also runs the Thomas Aquinas Psychological Clinic in En-
cino, California, where he advises parents, their children, and adult homosexuals on how 
to establish and preserve heterosexuality, particularly in males. Id. 
49 Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 Colum. 
L. Rev. 181, 184 (2001). Correctly, Franke notes that even heterosexuality gets more scrutiny 
than reproduction: “Why is it that we are willing to acknowledge that heteronormative cul-
tural preferences play a significant role in sexual orientation and selection of sexual partners, 
while at the same time refusing to treat repronormative forces as warranting similar theoreti-
cal attention?” Id. In a somewhat harsher tone, Kerry Quinn concurs with Franke: “In addi-
tion to failing on feminists’ own terms, the child idolatry and family values of the debate has 
productive and destructive effects . . . . [T]heir rhetoric reinforces the normalcy and desir-
ability of the traditional family model.” See Kerry L. Quinn, Mommy Dearest: The Focus on the 
Family in Legal Feminism, 37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 447, 465 (2002). 
50 See Franke, supra note 49, at 182. 
51 See id. at 186. When examining objections to challenges of repronormativity, Franke 
correctly notes that its proponents tend immediately to assert a collective interest in re-
producing the species: “Certainly this must be right, but the conversation-stopping power 
of this natalist objection should not be overstated. The fact that the future of the species 
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grounding of such a species interest more skeptically, although that is 
beyond the scope of this article. Second, I object to her proposal that 
the conflict between deemphasizing reproduction and preserving soci-
ety could be mitigated with foreign labor.52 As I do, she notes the re-
gressivity of repronormativity—for example, when she alludes to the 
“monied womb.”53 Her reliance on immigration to serve a national in-
terest in reproduction, however, would seem merely to shift the burden 
of reproductive labor onto those abroad.54 
 Mary Becker has objected to Franke’s critique, particularly as it 
relates to the poor.55 She queries what “Franke [would] do with poor 
children (who will continue to be born)? Without supports, they will 
not be able to develop their capabilities to become the productive citi-
zens they could be.”56 On this point, I urge a sharp distinction between 
the interests of lives-in-being (including the right to economic support) 
and those of future people, along the lines of the “minimum birth-
rights” argument discussed later.57 The distinction flows from my ex-
perience with dependency as the brother of a developmentally-disabled 
man. Advocating for him, his dignity, and his care is not inconsistent 
with the philosophical conviction that—all else being equal—it might 
be better for all concerned to avoid future lives as seriously compro-
mised as that of my brother. Unsentimental? Perhaps, but it is hardly 
the logic of Sparta. Reproducing dependency is no virtue, but caring 
for dependents is. 
 And the issue goes to the heart of how the cases discussed in the 
next section create dependency in heterosexuals by providing a legal 
subsidy of social approval for questionable reproductive practices.58 
This question matters because—as I consider in more detail later in 
the context of how children provide symbolic capital—how we “price” 
reproduction as a symbol may influence the demand for children. 
                                                                                                                      
depends upon ongoing reproduction does not relieve us from devoting critical attention 
to the manners in which this biological demand becomes culturally organized.” Id. 
52 See id. at 193. Franke is right, of course, in recognizing the substitutability of foreign 
workers for citizens: “The need to maintain a certain corps of tax-paying workers could be 
met through manipulation of our immigration laws—as we have done in the past to meet 
demand in particular sectors of the economy.” Id. 
53 Id. at 195. 
54 See id. 
55 See Mary Becker, Caring for Children and Caretakers, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1495, 1533 
(2001). 
56 Id. 
57 See infra notes 279–280 for a discussion of minimum birthrights. 
58 See infra notes 118–133 and accompanying text. 
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 Franke observes that “repronormativity remains in the closet” 
while critiques of compulsory heterosexuality have gotten more trac-
tion.59 Agreeing, my argument expands on her point that “reproduc-
tion of society takes place constantly through countless reiterative prac-
tices, many of which are structured as simultaneously productive and 
consumptive in nature.”60 My specific contention (developed in greater 
detail in the following Part) is that heterosexuality “makes a market” for 
reproduction and vice-versa, although these links are not immediately 
apparent because of the “invisibility” to some of heterosexuality as a 
norm. By drawing attention to reproduction, I try to combat the unre-
flectiveness which Devon Carbado has noted about heterosexuals.61 
This patterned unawareness is an example of what one Marx scholar 
has called “reproductive praxis”: 
People engaged in reproductive praxis are born into certain 
social relations, modes of existence, which they accept as 
natural, even inevitable. They fail to question these and, 
therefore, reproduce the type of consciousness and condi-
tions of social being that are already in existence. Minor 
changes or reforms may be attained, but these are not of a type 
that challenges or threatens the fundamental social relations.62 
 Thus does normative heterosexuality come to seem “natural” in 
the formulation above.63 Should discordant facts appear—like a gay 
child—some “minor changes” are possible, like the often belated rec-
onciliation of disappointed parents who come to “love” their gay child 
nonetheless, and the growing but resisted (which resistance becomes 
more notable with time) recognition that parental opprobrium can 
contribute to elevated suicide rates among gay teens.64 Merely tweaking 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Franke, supra note 49, at 185. 
60 Id. at 189. Franke objects to the “bourgeois framing of an issue that gives the larger 
public the tab for the marketing-induced ‘needs’ of children.” Id. at 192. I do too. 
61 Carbado, supra note 43, at 95 (“[R]arely do heterosexuals critically examine their 
identities as heterosexual, their sexual identity privilege. Indeed, even pro-gay rights het-
erosexuals conceive of sexual identity as something other(ed) people have, something that 
disadvantages other(ed) people.”). 
62 Paula Allman, Antonio Gramsci’s Contributions to Radical Adult Education, in Gramsci 
and Education 201, 203 (Carmel Borg et al. eds., 2002) (emphasis added). 
63 See id. 
64 See Martin, supra note 43 at 167–78. Sonia Renee Martin notes several factors that 
lead parents to repudiate gay and lesbian children and that result, among other things, in 
elevated suicide levels of gay and lesbian youth. Id. “Family problems contribute heavily to 
the disproportionate number of gay and lesbian teen suicide attempts and deaths.” Id. at 
175 (citing discussion of gay and lesbian youth suicide in Paul Gibson, Gay Male and Les-
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the norm system, though, does nothing to end either the “fundamental 
social relation” which underlies it or the reproduction of these social 
relations.65 
 On this point, Catharine MacKinnon’s early work on links between 
radical feminism and Marxian thought bears on how the parental taste 
for heterosexuality comes to be made invisible.66 (Indeed, my argu-
ment is a corollary of her thesis that heterosexuality founds patriarchy.) 
In Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, Catharine MacKinnon explains 
the subordination of women by men as part of an “epic theory” about 
“male power as an ordered yet deranged whole.”67 The reproduction of 
normative heterosexuality—both materially in children and more 
widely in law and culture—also structures law and social life in an or-
dered and deranged way. By substituting “heterosexual reproductivist” 
for “male” in key passages of MacKinnon’s work, one sees the force of 
the analogy: 
In [heterosexual reproductivist] societies, the [heterosexual 
reproductivist] standpoint dominates civil society in the form 
of the objective standard—that standpoint which, because it 
dominates in the world, does not appear to function as a 
standpoint at all. . . . The state incorporates these facts of social 
power in and as law. Two things happen: law becomes legiti-
mate [that is, by following the pattern of social dominance], 
and social dominance becomes invisible. Liberal legalism is 
thus a medium for making [heterosexual reproductivist] 
dominance both invisible and legitimate by adopting the [het-
                                                                                                                      
bian Youth Suicide, in U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Report of the 
Secretary’s Task Force on Youth Suicide 110 (1989)). These youths are two to three 
times more likely to attempt suicide than other kids their age and constitute thirty percent 
of the country’s completed suicides. Id.; see also Elvia R. Arriola, The Penalties for Puppy Love: 
Institutionalized Violence Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered Youth, 1 J. Gender 
Race & Just. 429, 455 (1998) (citing research on parental influence on the self-esteem of 
gay and lesbian youth) (“[T]he inner turmoil and isolation for LGBT teens resulting from 
unsupportive homes, churches and schools have emotional costs with physical side effects 
(for example, insomnia, fatigue, ulcers) that create a situation ripe for the possibility of 
attempted suicide.”). 
65 See Allman, supra note 62, at 203. 
66 See generally MacKinnon, supra note 21. 
67 Quoting the work of Sheldon Wolin, MacKinnon points out that epic theory does 
not merely describe the world but explains structural reproduction in the hopes of inter-
vening not only in theory but in the condition of the world itself: “An epic theory identi-
fies basic principles in political life which produce errors and mistakes in social ‘arrange-
ments, decisions, and beliefs’ and which cannot be dismissed as episodic. . . . [E]pic 
theories provide ‘a symbolic picture of an ordered whole’ that is ‘systematically de-
ranged.’” See id. at x. 
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erosexual reproductivist] point of view in law at the same time 
as it enforces that view on society.68 
 The auction and judicial tastes for heterosexuality discussed be-
low in the context of Morrison and Hernandez form only one head of 
the heterosexual reproductivist hydra in law. Although I will discuss 
only its link to marriage, let me outline its overall structure. It is 
formed by several deductive premises—some explicit, others implicit. 
These premises include the following: (i) existence—whatever the 
subjective qualities of that experience—is preferable to nonexistence, 
as reflected in legal decisions about wrongful life,69 suicide,70 and in-
                                                                                                                      
68 See id. at 237. Another good passage for substitution that considers the role of law 
reads: “Through legal mediation, [heterosexual reproductivist] dominance is made to 
seem a feature of life, not a one-sided construct imposed by force for the advantage of a 
dominant group. To the degree it succeeds ontologically . . . control over being produces 
control over consciousness, fusing material conditions with consciousness . . . . Coercion 
legitimated becomes consent.” See id. 
69 Consider state courts’ unwillingness to recognize a hedonic interest in nonexistence 
through wrongful life claims. See, e.g., Kurtis J. Kearl, Note, Turpin v. Sortini: Recognizing the 
Unsupportable Cause of Action for Wrongful Life, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 1278, 1287–88 (1983) (reject-
ing legal arguments about the preferability of nonexistence in the context of a California 
Supreme Court decision granting special damages for wrongful life to a child born deaf). 
Only three states recognize any form of wrongful life claim. Deana A. Pollard, Wrongful 
Analysis in Wrongful Life Jurisprudence, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 327, 329 & n.12 (2004) (arguing that 
state tort law uses incorrect concepts of damage recovery when denying recognition of 
wrongful life causes of action). However, even those states limit damage recovery to special 
damages and do not permit recovery for any interest in not having been born at all. Id. at 
329 & n.12. This is so despite a good proposal for measuring general damages that avoids 
the conceptual hurdle in recognizing an interest in nonexistence. See Bonnie Steinbock, 
The Logical Case for “Wrongful Life,” Hastings Ctr. Rep., Apr. 1986, at 15, 17 (comparing 
wrongful life damages assessments to those made in wrongful death claims and finding 
that in both, the jury must make valuations comparing an impaired or healthy life with 
non-existence). 
70 This reflects Immanuel Kant’s sin in “Christianizing” much of Stoic philosophy. 
Early Stoics took suicide in stride: “Suicide was viewed as a simple alternative when faced 
with certain situations, and nothing to spend one’s time thinking or worrying about. The 
early Stoics followed this lead, allowing for and even recommending suicide in certain 
circumstances, but not giving the topic any inordinate attention.” Michael Seidler, Kant and 
the Stoics on Suicide, 44 J. of the Hist. of Ideas 429, 430 (1983) (discussing Stoic ideas about 
suicide). See generally Daniel M. Crone, Historical Attitudes Toward Suicide, 35 Duq. L. Rev. 7, 16 
(1996) (discussing Seneca’s support for suicide and reviewing the praise of Cato’s suicide for 
“fear of dishonor”). A lifelong student of Stoic philosophy, Kant rejected the Stoic view that 
suicide was morally acceptable and, at times, morally superior than continuing to live. 
Seidler, supra, at 440–41. Consistent with my thesis that reproductivism forms part of a con-
solidated mental system, Seidler suggests a potential link in Kant’s writings between nonre-
productive sex and suicide. See id. at 442 (“Kant’s revulsion against suicide is as intense as his 
nausea at sexual perversion . . . .” (citation omitted)). I explore this idea later using Lee 
Edelman’s argument that heterosexuality represents generative life and homosexuality 
death. See infra notes 206–214 and accompanying text. 
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voluntary sterilization;71 (ii) reproduction tends to further self-
interest, including through saving for old age in the form of chil-
dren’s anticipated future support and through the satisfaction of feel-
ing that one has contributed to society;72 (iii) without reproduction, 
society would perish;73 and, given the foregoing; (iv) courts must en-
able parents to inculcate their children with reproductivist values (as 
well as many others).74 
                                                                                                                      
71 Similar debates have erupted in the recent revival among state courts of Buck v. Bell, 
a case that affirmed the constitutionality of a state sterilization statute for individuals with 
hereditary mental illness. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“It is better for all the world, if instead 
of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbe-
cility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.” (cita-
tion omitted)). In these cases, state courts have upheld the constitutionality of state statues 
that require sterilization of profoundly mentally retarded persons. Norman Cantor, The 
Relation Between Autonomy-Based Rights and Profoundly Mentally Disabled Persons, 13 Annals 
Health L. 37, 53 (2004). 
Today, most of the states that had refused in the 1970s to find inherent juris-
diction to authorize sterilization of a mentally disabled person have changed 
their law; statutes now permit sterilization where a court finds that the sur-
gery will serve the incapacitated person’s best interests. Only one state ap-
pears to continue to exclude all surrogate authorization of sterilization. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
72 The existence of other income security schemes, like national retirement plans, un-
dermines the savings rationale. T. Paul Schultz, Demand for Children in Low Income Countries, 
in Handbook of Population and Family Economics, supra note 1, at 349, 388. As for 
leaving a legacy through children, one tongue-in-cheek commentator noted the downside: 
“The import of your existence can be validated by whoever you bring into the world. But 
this doesn’t always work. In fact, sometimes it makes things worse. . . . [T]here’s now an 
innocent woman whose one-sentence newspaper bio will forever be, ‘She was Timothy 
McVeigh’s mother.’” Chuck Klosterman, Sex, Drugs, and Cocoa Puffs: A Low Cul-
ture Manifesto 194 (2004). 
73 The court in Anderson v. King County explicitly based part of its holding on this ra-
tionale. 138 P.3d 963, 969 (Wash. 2006) (“[T]he legislature was entitled to believe that 
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples furthers procreation, essential to survival of the 
human race . . . .”); see also Skinner v. State, 316 U.S. at 535, 541 (1942) (“Marriage and 
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”). Non-
reproductive dystopia is the premise of the recent film, The Children of Men (Universal 
2006). See The Children of Men, http://www.paramountpictures.co.uk/childrenofmen/ (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2008). 
74 A prominent and especially unfortunate example of this is parental over-involvement 
in a young daughter’s reproductive autonomy. See Katheryn D. Katz, The Pregnant Child’s 
Right to Self-Determination, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 1119, 1162–67 (1999) (concluding that statutes 
giving parents power over their children’s reproductive autonomy fail to consider the un-
toward effects of pregnancy, birth, and childrearing when weighing the best interests of 
pregnant children). J. Shoshanna Ehrlich’s excellent discussion of reproduction by young 
women combines legal analysis with a behavioral perspective. See generally J. Shoshanna 
Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality of Their Lives: Listening to Teens Who Make the Abortion Decision 
Without Involving Their Parents, 18 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 61 (2003) (presenting results of 
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 The argument below about Morrison and Hernandez targets this 
wider reproductivist system by zeroing in one of its key aspects: hetero-
sexual coitus. While the analysis may raise more questions than it re-
solves, my point is to lay more of a theoretical foundation in law for 
skepticism about reproduction. As a first step, this article examines how 
these cases privilege the taste for heterosexuality and its reproduction 
in the way that they attempt to resolve their central contradiction: af-
firming the superiority of heterosexuality and its reproduction while 
admitting that heterosexual coitus is fraught with risks to both parents 
and children alike. 
B. A Judicial Analogue: Morrison and Hernandez 
 The parental taste for heterosexuality finds its echo in law too. Af-
ter briefly reviewing the context for reproduction in the culture wars 
about marriage, I look at how Morrison and Hernandez impose the tradi-
tional legal disability on homosexuals in marriage with a new twist 
based on the wages of heterosexual coitus. I conclude this section by 
situating my argument in some of the conceptual problems faced by 
legal feminism. 
1. Reproduction in the Culture Wars over Marriage 
 Morrison and Hernandez arise out of a national culture war about 
the normative status in law of heterosexuality, part of which involves the 
link between marriage and reproduction. One of the most salient legal 
aspects of the culture war over heterosexuality is the differential stan-
dards of review which courts apply based on whether plaintiffs are het-
erosexuals or homosexuals.75 Consistent with this differential treat-
ment, the only significant constitutional cases striking down laws that 
targeted homosexuals, Lawrence v. Texas and Romer v. Evans, involved 
failures to satisfy low or ambiguous standards of review.76 And, even 
                                                                                                                      
empirical study of the reproductive decision-making of pregnant teenage females in state 
requiring parental notification). 
75 See infra notes 76–81, 113–115 and accompanying text. 
76 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I turn now to 
the ground on which the Court squarely rests its holding: the contention that there is no 
rational basis for the law here under attack.”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 634–35 (1996) 
(finding no rational basis in a constitutional amendment barring access to democratic 
processes in order to secure anti-discrimination provisions against certain sexual minori-
ties). Laurence Tribe notes that it is difficult to characterize the standard of review in Law-
rence v. Texas: “To search for the magic words proclaiming the right protected in Lawrence 
to be “fundamental,” and to assume that in the absence of those words mere rationality 
 
22 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 28:1 
then, courts have construed the scope of Lawrence and Romer relatively 
narrowly.77 
 The same is true when it comes to reproduction. Let me briefly 
point out how courts generally deploy “heterosexual” and “homosex-
ual” as legal categories with respect to reproduction. The constitutional 
dimensions of state law on both marriage78 and reproduction79 remain 
                                                                                                                      
review applied, is to universalize what is in fact only an occasional practice.” Laurence H. 
Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1893, 1917 (2004). This article argues that the “occasional practice” that Tribe 
points to is, in fact, part of a coherent set of categorization practices that systematically try 
to erase homosexual identity by giving heterosexual identity a preference as a norm. See 
infra notes 228–235, 281–284 and accompanying text. 
77 The Romer majority does not foreclose a finding that the right to participate equally 
in the political process is a fundamental one—for sexual minorities or any one else—or 
that heightened scrutiny could apply to state action that may violate equal protection of 
sexual minorities. But most subsequent cases have cited Romer to uphold antigay laws so 
long as they satisfy mere rationality. See, e.g., Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 
F.3d 859, 867 (8th Cir. 2006) (reversing a district court’s finding that the Nebraska’s De-
fense of Marriage Act failed to meet Romer’s rational review standard); Able v. United 
States, 155 F.3d 628, 634–35 (2d Cir. 1998) (distinguishing Romer’s inability to find a ra-
tional basis for Amendment Two from the military’s “acceptable” rationale for excluding 
known homosexuals from military service); Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of 
Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding anti-gay referendum amending Cin-
cinnati’s charter); Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (apply-
ing rational basis review to California and federal restrictions on marriage by homosexuals 
despite the “tenuous” rationality of the laws); Bailey v. City of Austin, 972 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 
App. 1998) (upholding city initiative barring city from extending employee benefits to 
same-sex partners). But see Finstuen v. Edmondson, No. CIV-04-1152-C, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 32122 (W.D. Okla. May 19, 2006, aff’d, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18500, (10th Cir., 
August 3, 2007) (citing Romer to declare unconstitutional an Oklahoma statue forbidding 
the recognition of foreign adoptions by same-sex parents); Dep’t of Human Servs. v. How-
ard, No. 05-814, 2006 Ark. LEXIS 418 (Ark. June 29, 2006) (upholding a lower court deci-
sion that cited Romer to overturn Arkansas regulations that kept homosexuals from serving 
as foster parents). 
78 As one scholar has noted: 
[W]e know astonishingly little about the constitutional parameters of mar-
riage. We do know that individuals enjoy a right to marry under the “liberty” 
interest of substantive due process . . . . We do not know how far this liberty to 
marry extends, what level of scrutiny should be applied in a particular case, 
or whether laws restricting marriage based on classifications other than race 
(e.g., sexual orientation) would violate equal protection. 
Elizabeth Price Foley, Liberty for All: Reclaiming Individual Privacy in a New 
Era of Public Morality 68 (2006). 
79 Procreative liberty remains in a haze rivaling that of the copulating heterosexuals 
postulated by Morrison and Hernandez: “Despite recent concerns about population control, 
the right to procreate remains relatively ambiguous in contrast to the right not to procreate, 
which in the abortion context is limited by the interest of the fetus.” Elizabeth Scott, Sterili-
zation of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 Duke L.J. 806, 
828 (citation omitted). 
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largely unsettled. Yet, consistently, patterns of differential judicial re-
view emerge based on the sexual orientation of the plaintiff class. 
Stricter standards of review are applied to restraints on heterosexual 
marriage, reproduction, and intimacy.80 In contrast, lower standards of 
review tend to be applied to analogous restraints on homosexuals.81 To 
date, over a dozen judicial challenges have been made to state laws re-
stricting marriage to heterosexuals.82 Only in Massachusetts has any of 
these challenges met with success.83 The federal Defense of Marriage 
Act, however, ensured that these same-sex marriages would be stripped 
of the big-dollar federal benefits straight marriages receive.84 The same 
discrepancy appears in adoption and custody proceedings.85 
                                                                                                                      
80 See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming Roe v. 
Wade); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to restriction on funda-
mental right to abortion based on due process); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) 
(holding that marriage is “one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free [heterosexual] men”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
(applying increased scrutiny to Connecticut law prohibiting the sale of contraceptives); 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, at 541 (1942) (classifying marriage as one of the “basic 
civil rights of [a heterosexual] man”). 
81 See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. 2005); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 
N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006). These judges use the word “rational” to refer to levels of review 
that require less than what would be considered minimally rational in other fora where 
legal rationality is rehearsed and tested, such as the Law School Admissions Test, law 
school examinations, and in-class discussions. 
82 A complete chronological list of thirteen judicial decisions from 1971 to 1995 reject-
ing homosexual plaintiffs’ assertions of the right to marry may be found in William N. 
Eskridge & Nan D. Hunter, Sexuality, Gender, and the Law 1065 n.c. (2004). For the 
most current information on these challenges, see Human Rights Campaign, Marriage & 
Relationship Recognition, http://www.hrc.org/issues/marriage.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 
2008). 
83 See generally Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
84 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 C (2000)). 
85 With respect to adoption, courts apply a more deferential standard of review to state 
action that restricts the right to adopt because the institution of adoption itself flows from 
statute, not common law. See Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 130–31(7th Cir. 1989) (“The 
adoption process is entirely a creature of state law, and parental rights and expectations 
involving adoption have historically been governed by legislative enactment.”) However, 
courts may go to extravagant lengths to find rationality when the state acts against homo-
sexuals. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 825 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (“Also, we must credit any conceivable rational reason that the legislature might 
have for choosing not to alter its statutory scheme in response to . . . recent social science 
research [in support of same-sex parenting].”). A similar pattern emerges in custody pro-
ceedings, especially when courts follow the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act’s distinc-
tion between homosexual identity and behavior, such that the latter may be considered 
against the best interests of the child. See generally Matt Larsen, Note, Lawrence v. Texas and 
Family Law: Gay Parents’ Constitutional Rights in Child Custody Proceedings, 60 N.Y.U. Ann. 
Surv. Am. L. 53 (2004). 
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 In state equal protection doctrine, many categorizations of hetero-
sexuals based on reproduction affirm the legally privileged status of 
heterosexuality without looking closely at heterosexual coitus as a re-
productive reality. The concurrence in Lewis v. Harris is one example: 
The simple fact is that the very existence of marriage does 
“privilege procreative heterosexual intercourse.” . . . Procreative 
heterosexual intercourse is and has been historically through 
all times and cultures an important feature of that privileged 
status, and that characteristic is a fundamental, originating rea-
son why the State privileges marriage.86 
 Confirming its centrality in these legal conflicts about marriage, 
the issue of reproduction helped to produce one of the relatively more 
favorable precedents for homosexuals in the conflict over marriage, 
Baker v. State.87 The Vermont court affirmed the link between marriage 
and the state interest in regulating procreation, noting that the state 
has a “legitimate and long-standing interest in promoting a permanent 
commitment between couples for the security of their children.”88 
Since the Vermont Legislature had already eliminated legal restrictions 
on adoption and childrearing by homosexuals, the court reasoned that, 
“to the extent that the state’s purpose in licensing civil marriage was, 
and is, to legitimize children and provide for their security, the [hetero-
sexual marriage] statutes plainly exclude many same-sex couples who 
are no different from opposite-sex couples with respect to these objec-
tives.”89 
 In other words, once the Legislature has allowed homosexuals to 
play in the “Ponzi scheme” of reproductivism, all players—even homo-
                                                                                                                      
86 Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (Parrillo, J., con-
curring), aff’d as modified, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). 
87 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). Baker involved an appeal by three same-sex couples of a 
trial court dismissal of their complaint for declaratory judgment that the town clerks’ re-
fusal to issue the plaintiffs marriage licenses violated the Vermont Constitution. Id. at 867. 
The plaintiffs claimed that the trial court had misconstrued Vermont’s marriage statute 
and asserted, in the alternative, that any statutory exclusion of homosexuals from marriage 
violated the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution. Id. at 868, 870. The 
plaintiffs failed on the statutory claim. Id. at 869. The Court held that the Common Bene-
fits Clause required Vermont to extend the substantive protections of marriage to plain-
tiffs. Id. at 886. As remedy, the court directed the legislature to revise statutory marriage to 
include homosexuals or to fashion a parallel status for homosexuals. Id. The legislature 
chose the latter. See 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 (act relating to civil unions). See generally 
State of Vermont, House of Representatives, Questions and Answers About H.847 as Passed by 
the General Assembly, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/baker/h-847q&a.htm. 
88 Baker, 744 A.2d at 881. 
89 Id. at 882. 
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sexuals—must have equal access to the rights incident to marriage.90 
Nevertheless, even this relatively evenhanded approach to marriage 
access for homosexuals betrays an unreflectiveness about how norma-
tive heterosexuality works. Startlingly, the Baker court is unable to find 
an “intent” in heterosexual-only marriage regimes to discriminate 
against homosexuals: 
It is one thing to show that long-repealed marriage statutes 
subordinated women to men within the marital relation. It is 
quite another to demonstrate that the authors of the marriage 
laws excluded same-sex couples because of incorrect and dis-
criminatory assumptions about gender roles or anxiety about 
gender-role confusion. That evidence is not before us.91 
 Nor could such evidence ever be made to appear in the swirling 
logic of heterosexual marriage, which starts—and ends—by foreclosing 
the possibility of such evidence without appearing ever to have done so. 
In post-modernist diction, evidence of this sort is “always already” ex-
cluded.92 Evidence of “intent” to discriminate here would presuppose 
the existence of “homosexual” as a category. It is, however, only after 
homosexuals gained some degree of visibility that legislators bothered 
organizing against sexual minorities as a class—a dynamic reflected in 
the “defense of marriage” movements.93 Hernandez draws on a sister 
                                                                                                                      
90 See id. 
91 Id. at 880 n.13. 
92 See Stanley Fish, There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech . . . and It’s a Good 
Thing Too 196 (1994). This adverb phrase reveals an effect of a social condition or prac-
tice which, although it is a “given,” may not be apparent. For example, Stanley Fish uses it 
to show how a legal authority that privileges one sensibility over another is as a matter of 
course linked and, indeed, defined by what is excluded: 
A politically earned authority is always already in a relation to the Other it is accused 
of scorning, and the problem (as some see it) of opening the law’s self-referential 
procedures to the pressures of the “real world” is no problem at all because that 
very self-referentiality (autonomy, unity, integrity, etc.) has been constructed (re-
constructed) in response to those pressures. 
Id. 
93 Consider the agility with which Congress and the states have (independently) en-
acted substantially uniform legislation prohibiting same-sex marriage once the specter of it 
appeared. At present, forty-five states have either constitutional amendments, statutes, or 
other laws restricting marriage to heterosexuals. Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Mar-
riage Prohibitions (as of Sept. 19, 2007), available at http://www.hrc.org/documents/ 
marriage_prohibit_20070919.pdf. Twenty-six of those are state constitutional amendments. 
Id. Twenty-two of these constitutional amendments were enacted in the two years after 
Massachusetts legalized gay marriage (2004–2006), a rate of almost one state constitutional 
amendment a month. Id. What is most useful to legal scholars is the rich record of legisla-
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tautology: that homosexual marriage is not rooted in tradition or cus-
tom.94 As the next section shows, these odd and circular forms of ar-
gument are the norm when courts look at heterosexuality and homo-
sexuality, especially where reproduction is concerned. 
2. Judicial Alchemy: Morrison and Hernandez 
 Although judicial rationales based on reproduction have as-
sumed new importance in recent litigation, David Cruz notes that 
such arguments appear in the earliest cases confirming the exclusion 
of homosexuals from marriage.95 Although they are squarely in this 
tradition, what is most interesting and original about Morrison and 
Hernandez is their candor about what is wrong with reproductive coital 
intercourse. Despite the blithe assertion of heterosexual privilege in 
Lewis v. Harris, the facts seem less simple to the courts in Morrison and 
Hernandez.96 This is so despite the standard of review common to both 
adjudications: mere rationality.97 
 Let me briefly summarize these cases before turning to their un-
flattering accounts of heterosexual coitus. Morrison involved an appeal 
from an Indiana trial court’s dismissal of a request for a declaratory 
judgment that plaintiffs, three same-sex couples, could obtain marriage 
licenses from the circuit clerks of Hendricks and Marion Counties.98 
The suit challenged Indiana’s Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which 
provides that “[o]nly a female may marry a male. Only a male may 
marry a female.”99 The three couples had each entered into a civil un-
ion in Vermont.100 Indiana law also withheld Full Faith and Credit to 
                                                                                                                      
tive agility to codify heterosexual animus in response to the perceived threat of gay mar-
riage. See generally American Bar Association Section of Family Law, A White Paper: An Analy-
sis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38 Fam. L. 
Q. 339 (2004) (summarizing state and federal law of marriage disability on sexual minori-
ties). Given this strong history of animus appearing contemporaneously with legal concep-
tions of homosexuality, it does not seem like a stretch to admit that, had drafters of mar-
riage statutes conceived of homosexuals, their reaction would have been to exclude them, 
if not worse. The concurrence by Justice Dooley in Baker suggests as much. See Baker, 744 
A.2d at 890–91 (Dooley, J., concurring). 
94 See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 9, 10. 
95 See David B. Cruz, Heterosexual Reproductive Imperatives, 56 Emory L.J. 1157, 1164 
(2007) (“This brings us to the kinder, gentler face of heterosexism today: reproduction.”). 
96 Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24; Lewis, 875 A.2d at 276; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 8. 
97 Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 8. 
98 Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 19. 
99 Ind. Code. § 31–11–1–1(a) (1997). 
100 Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 19. 
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same-sex marriages legal under the laws of a sister state.101 The plain-
tiffs claimed that Indiana’s DOMA violated provisions of the Indiana 
Constitution.102 The court failed to recognize any of the plaintiffs’ 
claims under these provisions.103 
 Hernandez confronted New York’s highest court, the Court of Ap-
peals, with the claim of forty-four same-sex couples that the restriction 
of marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the state constitution.104 New York’s marriage 
statute provided that “the parties must solemnly declare . . . that they 
take each other as husband and wife.”105 The plaintiffs sought a de-
claratory judgment that the statute, to the extent it prevented them 
from marrying, was unconstitutional.106 The trial court granted the 
plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion.107 On appeal, the Appellate Di-
vision rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments and reversed the motion.108 On 
final appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal.109 
 Had a consistent standard of judicial scrutiny applied to both ho-
mosexuals and heterosexuals, the relationship between reproduction 
and marriage would not have sustained a legally material difference 
between same-sex and opposite-sex unions.110 Let me point out some 
asymmetrical exercises of legal reasoning from the cases. First, consider 
the “one-drop rule” Hernandez adopts for deciding whether legal curbs 
on marriage and reproduction by homosexuals pass muster: so long as 
a potential legislative rationale—however remote—includes even one 
drop of reason, the court will acquiesce to the restriction.111 The Her-
nandez court notes, for instance, that “Plaintiffs have not persuaded us 
that this long-accepted restriction [of marriage to opposite-sex couples] 
is a wholly irrational one, based solely on ignorance and prejudice 
                                                                                                                      
101 Ind. Code. § 31–11–1–1(b) (1997). 
102 Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 19. The provisions in question were Indiana’s Equal Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, text in Article I about the meaning of a “core value,” and 
language in Article I guaranteeing effective access to justice. Id. at 21, 31, 34; see Ind. 
Const. art. 1, §§ 1, 12, 23. 
103 Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 35. 
104 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 5. 
105 Id. at 6. 
106 Id. at 5. New York State’s Due Process Clause provides that “[n]o person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6. New 
York State’s Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o person shall be denied the equal 
protection of the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof.” § 11. 
107 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 5. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text. 
111 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 8. 
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against homosexuals. This is the question on which these cases turn.”112 
While animus may not be the sole reason for marriage discrimination, 
it—and the social and legal traditions which flow from it—certainly are 
the primary ones. 
 Consider also the springing scrutiny in Hernandez for any meas-
ure that would better link marriage and reproduction at the expense 
of heterosexuals: “[L]imiting marriage to opposite-sex couples likely 
to have children would require grossly intrusive inquiries, and arbi-
trary and unreliable line-drawing. A legislature . . . could rationally 
find that an attempt to exclude childless opposite-sex couples from 
the institution would be a very bad idea.”113 
 Morrison makes a similar move. The court first states unambigu-
ously that, because the Indiana DOMA need pass only the “most basic 
rational relationship test” to be upheld, the burden of persuasion rests 
entirely on the plaintiffs to “negative every conceivable basis which 
might have supported the classification.”114 After noting that the plain-
tiffs do not meet this standard, the court adds that the “key question” is, 
also, whether same-sex marriage would satisfy “all” of the interests that 
cross-sex marriage furthers.115 So homosexuals in Indiana face a double 
burden of persuasion—not only must they refute all conceivable legis-
lative rationales for exclusion, but they must also show that letting ho-
mosexuals marry would serve all the interests of heterosexual mar-
riage.116 In any event, the point is gratuitous, since neither over-
inclusivity nor under-inclusivity would threaten the constitutionality of 
the state DOMA given Morrison’s construction of the standard of the 
review.117 
 Both courts support their holdings by stipulating to some impor-
tant advantages for children from same-sex households—an admission 
against interest which makes their otherwise unqualified legal support 
for heterosexuality as a norm more paradoxical.118 Morrison does this in 
the context of evaluating the plaintiffs’ claim that the Indiana DOMA 
violates the state’s Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause by privileg-
ing heterosexual reproduction above that of others.119 The court re-
                                                                                                                      
112 Id. (emphasis added). 
113 See id. at 11–12. 
114 Morrison, 821 N.E.2d 1, 22 (quoting Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind. 1994)). 
115 Id. at 23. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. at 22. 
118 See id. at 24; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7–10. 
119 Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 21. 
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sponds with a back-handed compliment to reproductive homosexuals, 
whom it presumes can provide—unaided—the sorts of “stable envi-
ronments” the state seeks for all children.120 These homosexual parents 
are presumed to be “financially and emotionally” invested, committed 
to childrearing, and, importantly, good at planning and thinking 
ahead.121 A recent study does find that the demographics of same-sex 
households who adopt (and foster) children are different: “Same-sex 
couples raising adopted children are older, more educated, and have 
more economic resources than other adoptive parents.”122 Same-sex 
couples raising foster children have the highest level of education; their 
incomes, too, are higher than those of unmarried cross-sex foster par-
ents, though cross-sex married couples have the highest incomes 
among foster parents.123 So, the court is on to something. 
 Because this is an equal protection claim being evaluated at the 
lowest level of scrutiny, the court also must consider how heterosexuals 
measure up.124 They leave something to be desired: heterosexual re-
production can occur “with no foresight or planning” from “one in-
stance of sexual intercourse” between heterosexuals who have shown 
“little or no contemplation of the consequences that might result.”125 
Logic would expect that such a side-by-side comparison would lead 
                                                                                                                      
120 See id. at 24. 
121 Id. The Court also notes that 
[Homosexuals and others] wanting to have children by assisted reproduction 
or adoption are, by necessity, heavily invested, financially and emotionally, in 
those processes. Those processes also require a great deal of foresight and 
planning. 
 . . . 
Members of a same-sex couple who wish to have a child . . . have already 
demonstrated their commitment to child-rearing, by virtue of the difficulty of 
obtaining a child through adoption or assisted reproduction, without the 
State necessarily having to encourage that commitment through the institu-
tion of marriage. 
Id. at 24, 26. 
122 Gates, et al., supra note 6, at 12, 26–28 (culling statistics on adoption and foster 
care by gays, lesbians, and heterosexuals using data from the U.S. Census 2000, the Na-
tional Survey of Family Growth (2002), and the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and 
Reporting System (2004)). For example, the mean income for cross-sex married couples 
who adopt is $81,900, while that of lesbian couples is $102,508 and that of gay male cou-
ples is $102,331. Id. at 11. When considering all child-rearing—not just adoption—same-
sex couples have lower income and educational levels than do married heterosexual cou-
ples. Id. at 12. 
123 Id. at 16. 
124 Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24–25. 
125 Id. at 25–26. 
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these courts to conclude that same-sex marriage would enhance the 
state’s interest in procreation; instead, a deus ex machina in the form of 
marriage emerges to save heterosexuals from themselves. It is marriage, 
Morrison holds, which can mitigate the problems caused by “time-
inconsistency” in casual heterosexual coitus.126 Marriage, says the court, 
encourages heterosexuals “to procreate within the legitimacy and sta-
bility of a state-sanctioned relationship and to [avoid] unplanned, out-
of-wedlock births resulting from ‘casual’ intercourse.”127 How marriage 
accomplishes this is not clear, given that it is apparently just an after-
thought to a coital accident.128 Nor does the court consider the obvi-
ous: if it is barriers to entry, as it were, that make homosexuals under-
take reproduction deliberately and properly, then why not consider 
mechanisms to encourage heterosexuals to be more deliberate about 
reproduction?129 
                                                                                                                      
126 See id. Some behavioral law and economics research finds that people’s preference 
are much less stable (or “time consistent”) than previously thought, perhaps explaining, as 
Manuel Utset has proposed, the peskiness of many self-control problems, including those 
related to sexual decision-making. 
First, even small self-control problems due to time-inconsistent preferences 
can produce large aggregate welfare losses, particularly when decisions are 
made and actions are taken in an incremental fashion over time—for exam-
ple the decision each day to smoke another pack of cigarettes or procrasti-
nate enrolling in a retirement account. Second, even when aware of their self-
control problems, people tend to mispredict the true magnitude of those 
problems and thus underappreciate the need to adopt commitment devices 
in response. 
See Manuel A. Utset, Time-Inconsistent Management & the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 31 Ohio N.U. L. 
Rev. 417, 419–20 (2005). 
127 Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24. Neither do the other reasons given by the court address 
the ex ante risks from impulsive coital intercourse. Id. at 24–25. 
128 Michael Lee Aday memorialized the time-inconsistency dilemma of heterosexual 
coitus in his song Paradise by the Dashboard Lights. Meatloaf, Paradise by the Dashboard Lights, 
on Bat Out of Hell (Cleveland Int’l Records 1977) (dramatizing conflict between ex 
ante negotiations about sex and regret ex post). 
129 See Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24. The Court notes: 
Those persons who have invested the significant time, effort, and expense as-
sociated with assisted reproduction or adoption may be seen as very likely to 
be able to provide such an environment [that is, one conducive to child rear-
ing], with or without the “protections” of marriage, because of the high level 
of financial and emotional commitment exerted in conceiving or adopting a 
child or children in the first place. 
Id. (emphasis added to draw attention to the implications of time-inconsistent behavior). 
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 Hernandez makes the same dodge: noting the recklessness of het-
erosexual coitus and asserting marriage as a risk mitigant ex post.130 
Hernandez notes that a rational legislature could find that heterosexual 
relationships are “all too often casual or temporary” and that they “pre-
sent a greater danger that children will be born into or grow up in un-
stable homes than is the case with same-sex couples.”131 Marriage, the 
court alleges, can “create more stability and permanence in the rela-
tionships that cause children to be born.”132 As in Morrison, Hernandez 
blurs the time-inconsistency problem it identifies (impaired rationality 
during coitus) and the remedy it extols (marriage ex post).133 What 
Wickard v. Filburn did to expand the outer limits of “rationality” in fed-
eral legislation based on the Commerce Clause, these cases do for the 
strained ends-means arguments resorted to by those seeking to keep 
marriage straight.134 
 One could infer a preference for heterosexuality—like the one 
discussed in the previous section about the auction—solely on the basis 
of this asymmetrical analysis. Hernandez, though, makes an express case 
for it (as do the players in the auction) in its second reason for why a 
rational legislature could limit marriage to heterosexuals: the notion 
that children are better off being raised in a cross-sex, heterosexual 
                                                                                                                      
130 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 6–8. Section III of the Hernandez opinion includes the 
court’s analysis of the rationality of limiting marriage to heterosexuals on account of their 
often irresponsible reproductive dynamics. Id. The court’s later consideration and rejec-
tion of the plaintiffs’ equal protection arguments incorporate Section III’s categorization 
discussion by implication when observing that the New York legislature could limit mar-
riage to heterosexuals “for the reasons we have explained . . . based on the different char-
acteristics of opposite-sex and same-sex relationships. Our earlier discussion [in Section 
III] demonstrates that the definition of marriage to include only opposite-sex couples is 
not irrationally underinclusive.” Id. at 11. Another demonstration of the incoherence of 
the court’s standard of review is that it justifies the admitted under-inclusivity, an argument 
which is surplus if the standard of review is mere rationality. 
131 Id. at 7. 
132 Id. 
133 See supra notes 124–129 and accompanying text. 
134 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Wickard involved the constitutionality, 
under the Commerce Clause, of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (“Act”), a piece of 
New Deal legislation which assessed fines on agricultural production in excess of established 
quotas. Id. at 113. A farmer who had grown 239 bushels of wheat for use by his family and as 
cattle feed was fined under the Act for excess production. Id. at 114. He appealed the fine. Id. 
at 113–14. Finding that even this negligible amount of excess production designed for per-
sonal use could exert a “substantial effect” on the federal scheme for regulating interstate 
commerce, the Supreme Court upheld the Act. Id. at 128–29. It is a strained construction of 
“substantial effect” on interstate commerce. It seems no more plausible that marriage as a 
“morning after” device for unintended pregnancy necessarily adds stability to that kind of 
family unit. 
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household.135 “Intuition and experience suggest that a child benefits 
from having before his or her eyes, every day, living models of what 
both a man and a woman are like,” says the court.136 
 It is this move which resolves, for the court at least, the central 
contradiction faced by the court. Presumably, it is heterosexuality’s 
inherent superiority which offsets the instability that necessitates acci-
dent-induced marriage. Could a minimally rational legislature really 
favor child-rearing by cross-sex couples as an essentialized class when 
that same legislature has also recognized that heterosexual marriages 
may be little more than damage control after impulsive coitus? I do 
not see how the two thoughts could be held at once: reckless repro-
duction due to problems of time-inconsistency in regulating sexual 
impulses, on the one hand, and the inherent superiority of hetero-
sexuality as a model, on the other.137 So I conclude that it must be 
some kind of visceral taste for heterosexuality that permits the courts 
to countenance these irregularities in reasoning. 
 The Hernandez plurality suggests some personal discomfort, on the 
part of the judges, with the conclusion that is compelled, in their opin-
ion, by the legal doctrine.138 Not so Judge Graffeo’s concurrence, 
which deserves particular consideration as the most primitive in its re-
assertion of heterosexual normativity.139 Judge Graffeo writes to “elabo-
rate” after the plurality has denied the plaintiffs’ request for a marriage 
license.140 The concurrence voices more support for the state’s asserted 
link between procreation and marriage than does the plurality’s more 
balanced consideration.141 First, the concurrence approvingly refer-
                                                                                                                      
135 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7. 
136 Id. 
137 Over one-third of adoption agencies in one study stated that they would reject a gay 
or lesbian applicant because of the agency’s religious ideologies or marriage requirements, 
or the director’s personal enmity against homosexuality. See Gates, et al., supra note 6, at 9. 
138 The plurality makes clear that it is their concept of judicial duty which compels 
their support for keeping marriage heterosexual: 
We emphasize once again that we are deciding only this constitutional ques-
tion. It is not for us to say whether same-sex marriage is right or wrong. We 
have presented some (though not all) of the arguments against same-sex 
marriage because our duty to defer to the Legislature requires us to do so. We 
do not imply that there are no persuasive arguments on the other side—and 
we know, of course, that there are very powerful emotions on both sides of 
the question. 
Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 12. 
139 See id. at 13. 
140 Id. at 12–13. 
141 Id. at 14–17. 
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ences the portion of a Minnesota Supreme Court opinion that points 
to the book of Genesis as support for the historic link between procrea-
tion and heterosexuality.142 Next, it wields Lawrence as an animus cap, 
not as that lever of equality which some giddy jurists have seen in it.143 
Judge Graffeo gleans from Lawrence that its prohibition on criminaliz-
ing homosexuality based on moral disapproval does not inhibit civil 
legal disabilities on homosexuals.144 It is a good point. 
 The capstone of the concurrence is that—and this is where he tips 
his hand—the statute does not really keep homosexuals from marrying: 
it is just that they cannot marry other homosexuals.145 “[I]individuals 
who seek marriage licenses are not queried concerning their sexual ori-
entation and are not precluded from marrying if they are not hetero-
sexual. Regardless of sexual orientation, any person can marry a person 
of the opposite sex.”146 And here we have spent all this wasted time and 
court costs. It is not the first time that the argument has been made.147 It 
is another example of symbolic violence in law, one so absurd that it 
could not have been arrived upon through reason.148 
                                                                                                                      
142 See id. at 17, n.4 (citing Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (1971). 
143 See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 17–18. Lawrence should not be seen as a radical change 
because its holding is narrowly bounded. See generally Katherine M. Franke, Commentary, 
The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1399, 1399–1400 (2004) 
(“The ACLU proclaimed: ‘It gave us the constitutional right to form intimate relationships 
and to sexual expression. For that, Lawrence changes everything.’ Everything? That may 
overstate the significance of the case somewhat.”(citation omitted)); Berta E. Hernández-
Truyol, Querying Lawrence, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 1151, 1240–50 (2004) (noting the hetero-
normative limits of the privacy and equality rationales advanced by Lawrence). 
144 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 18. It is a good example of “death by distinction”: 
The right affirmed by the Supreme Court in Lawrence is not comparable to 
the new right to marry plaintiffs assert here, nor is the Texas statute criminal-
izing homosexual sodomy analogous to the marriage statutes under review. 
The Domestic Relations Law is not a penal provision and New York has not at-
tempted to regulate plaintiffs’ private sexual conduct or disturb the sanctity 
of their homes. And, in contrast to the Texas statute, New York’s marriage 
laws are part of a longstanding tradition with roots dating back long before 
the adoption of our State Constitution. 
Id. 
145 Id. at 20. 
146 Id. 
147 Other cases considering equal protection have put forth similar arguments. See, e.g., 
Lewis, 875 A.2d at 263 (quoting trial court: “Plaintiffs, like anyone else in the state, may 
receive a marriage license, provided that they meet the statutory criteria for marriage, 
including an intended spouse of the opposite gender. . . . The State makes the same bene-
fit, mixed-gender marriage, available to all individuals on the same basis.”). 
148 See infra note 235. 
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 The dissent by Chief Justice Kaye responds well not only to the 
plurality opinion but to the sharp concurrence too.149 Chief Justice 
Kaye concludes that the exclusion of homosexuals from marriage is 
subject to heightened scrutiny for three reasons: homosexuals are a 
suspect class; their exclusion from marriage flows from a sex-based dis-
tinction; and the right in question—marriage—is a fundamental one.150 
Nevertheless, applying an evenhanded minimal rationality review for 
argument’s sake, she concludes that the exclusion of homosexuals from 
marriage serves no legitimate state interest, including the interests typi-
cally used to justify such exclusion: fostering reproduction, furthering 
moral disapproval of homosexuals, keeping with tradition, and main-
taining uniformity with the marriage law of sister states.151 
 With the notable exception of Chief Justice Kaye’s dissent, the ju-
dicial reasoning in Morrison and Hernandez has more in common with 
religious doctrine than with the secular reasoning one expects from 
these courts.152 These cases do rely on some non-tautological argu-
ments, but they are few and far between.153 As the next section shows, 
unstable standards of review and incoherent modes of differentiation 
are the rule where legal categorizations of heterosexual and homosex-
ual are concerned. 
                                                                                                                      
149 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 22–34. 
150 Id. at 27–30. 
151 Id. at 30–34. 
152 Indeed, the arguments in Morrison and Hernandez are in line with the shift from 
reason to religious orthodoxy that Charles Freeman describes in his excellent book on the 
consolidation of Christian power in the Roman Catholic church beginning in the third 
century: 
The imposition of orthodoxy went hand in hand with a stifling of any form of 
independent reasoning. By the fifth century, not only rational thought had 
been suppressed, but there has been a substitution for it of “mystery, magic, 
and authority,” a substitution which drew heavily on irrational elements of 
pagan society that had never been distinguished. Pope Gregory the Great 
warned those with a rational turn of mind that, by looking for cause and ef-
fect in the natural world, they were ignoring the cause of all things, the will of 
God. 
See Charles Freeman, The Closing of the Western Mind: The Rise of Faith and the 
Fall of Reason, at xviii–xix (2002) (tracing the active suppression of the Greek intellec-
tual tradition from Constantine to Aquinas). 
153 See Tamayo, supra note 15, at 64 (“[The] court’s reliance on the link between het-
erosexual intercourse and procreation to exclude same-sex partners’ relationships from 
recognition as state-sanctioned marriages displays stagnant tautology closely mirroring 
early decisional law.”). 
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3. Copula Copularum : Understanding Judicial Incoherence Through 
Paranoia 
 Despite losing, the plaintiffs in Morrison and Hernandez (and their 
advocates) have helped to get these courts on the record about legal 
heterosexuality. The court of history will do its job. By considering the 
legal doctrine, I was not suggesting that there was much chance that 
the plaintiffs could prevail. I offered the legal doctrine not for its truth, 
but only for the fact of its utterance in order to examine its meaning.154 
 For that, let me start with Janet Halley’s analysis of how courts clas-
sify heterosexuality in federal equal protection doctrine. She has noted 
that it is the “practices of categorization” rather than the coherence of the 
categories themselves which matter.155 She points out the “diacritical” 
relationship between legal categories for heterosexuality and homo-
sexuality, such that each depends on the other for its identity.156 Halley 
also has observed that, while law marked homosexuals in different 
ways—sodomy being a typical mark because, at the time, Bowers v. Hard-
wick let states criminalize gay sex157—heterosexuals were not categori-
cally defined or otherwise legally marked: they were just “nonhomosex-
uals.”158 The invisibility of heterosexuals as a “default class” depended 
on what Halley called the “coercive dynamics of its incoherence” as a 
class.159 
                                                                                                                      
154 Those who would exclude homosexuals from marriage can rest easy for another 
generation or so, although the moral standing of their claims will keep slipping. My money 
says that the federal Defense of Marriage Act will not be repealed or abolished for at least 
fifteen years. 
155 See Janet Halley, The Construction of Heterosexuality, in Fear of a Queer Planet, su-
pra note 47, at 82, 83. Halley’s point about equal protection analysis should be extended to 
legal constructions of heterosexuality generally: “Indeed, it seems to me to be a timely 
moment to argue that equal protection theorizing should focus not, as it has until the last 
few years, on categories, but on practices of categorization.” Id. 
156 Id. (“The two classifications [i.e., heterosexual and homosexual] are diacritical in 
the sense that they acquire definition and meaning in relation to one another: the fact that 
the more privileged class [heterosexuals] habitually hides its existence as a class doesn’t 
mean that legal decision makers can afford to ignore it.”). 
157 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003). 
158 See Halley, supra note 155, at 83. Halley notes how this indeterminacy does, how-
ever, constitute “nonhomosexuals” as a default class, one that by implication includes het-
erosexuals: “[L]egal definitions of the class of homosexuals persistently involve equally 
decisive, but far less visible, practices of constituting a class of heterosexuals. . . . Despite its 
representation as monolithic in its nonhomosexuality, heterosexuality as it operates in 
federal equal protection cases is a highly unstable, default characterization . . . .” Id. 
159 Id. at 86. As Halley points out, as a legal category heterosexuality is “profoundly 
heterogeneous, unstable, and provisional. . . . [I]t owes its glory days as a coherent social 
 
36 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 28:1 
 When two things are diacritically defined against each other, each 
one must be distinct enough from the other to sustain the difference. 
The same principle—in theory, at least—underlies the state equal pro-
tection doctrine analyzed here. Equal protection doctrine offers useful 
side-by-side comparisons of “heterosexual” and “homosexual” because 
its function is to test the logical quality of legal classification. The dia-
critical relationship which Halley noted earlier continues in Morrison 
and Hernandez, albeit in different terms. There are, however, only so 
many relevant characteristics which can sustain a legal difference be-
tween heterosexuality and homosexuality; now that sex is off the table 
after Lawrence, reproduction does the heavy lifting. 
 The new methods of jural marking deployed in Morrison and Her-
nandez are obvious if one knows what to look for: evidentiary standards 
for relevance and “intent” that ensure that same-sex plaintiffs are always 
already precluded from making the necessary showings; the “one drop 
rule” —deferring to anti-gay state action so long as the animus is not 
the sole motive; the failure to consider some obvious advantages which 
same-sex households may provide to children; the unreflective irony of 
elevating heterosexual reproduction to an end-in-itself immediately af-
ter recognizing its frequent recklessness; and, finally, the glib insults 
which find a safe harbor in legal doctrine.160 
These legal categorization practices may have all the self-awareness 
of a Sasha Baron Cohen character, e.g., Borat, but they embody a dis-
tinct moment in the categorization practices used by courts with respect 
to heterosexuality and homosexuality.161 In Morrison and Hernandez the 
legal category of “homosexual” is blurring while that of “heterosexual” 
                                                                                                                      
category to its members’ own failure to acknowledge its discursive constitution, the coercive 
dynamics of its incoherence.” Id. 
160 See supra notes 40, 90–94, 111–112, 118–133, 145–148 and accompanying text. 
161 Sex, reproduction, and marriage have been de-linked in practice, but remain bound 
in law: 
Contraception and abortion are now readily available. Many married women 
are financially capable of supporting themselves and their children. The so-
cial stigma attached to single parenthood has essentially disappeared. Chil-
dren are no longer viewed as financial assets but financial burdens, creating a 
strong incentive toward fewer children. The availability of adoption and arti-
ficial reproductive technologies . . . have expanded parental possibilities to 
single persons and same-sex couples in ways unimaginable only a few decades 
ago. 
See Foley, supra note 78, at 76. 
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is coming into focus, making it easier to examine, challenge, and, even-
tually, refute.162 
 The next Part offers one explanation for what causes these catego-
rization practices and the parental taste for heterosexuality. My argu-
ment is “structuralist” in that it suggests a system with relatively stable 
properties which interact with each other in recurrent, predictable 
ways.163 Because it focuses on consciousness, it is also Marxian, a tradi-
tion of explaining “organized social dominance” and its reproduction 
in human action.164 The argument is an example of what Janet Halley, 
following Judith Butler, designates the “copula” of structural feminist 
arguments: it is a rhetorical strategy that links social conditions and 
                                                                                                                      
162 The quickening of reproductive heterosexuality through marriage into a legal 
category exposes it to rational review, as illustrated by the recent Washington state refer-
endum that would have conditioned ongoing marital status on the production of children. 
See Washington Defense of Marriage Alliance, Initiative 957, http://www.secstate.wa.gov/ 
elections/initiatives/text/i957.pdf (last visited on Jan. 24, 2008). Gay activists challenged 
the rationality of reproductive heterosexual marriages in Initiative 957. See id. This state 
referendum, put forward by the Washington Defense of Marriage Alliance, was meant to 
better conform state marriage law to its stated legislative intent of furthering procreation. 
See id. Initiative 957 proposed to do this through several legal requirements intended to 
improve the enforcement of marriage’s asserted procreative imperative. See id. The pro-
posed bill added the phrase, “who are capable of having children with one another” to the 
legal definition of marriage; required that couples married in Washington file proof of 
procreation within three years of the date of marriage; required that couples married out 
of state file proof of procreation within three years of the date of marriage or have their 
marriage classed as “unrecognized”; established a process for filing proof of procreation; 
and made it a criminal act for people in an unrecognized marriage to receive marriage 
benefits. Id. However this initiative was not enacted and was later withdrawn by its sponsor. 
Proposed Initiatives to the People–2007, http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/ 
people.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). 
163 A structural approach describes a formal system of interdependent parts, which 
behave in predictable and recurrent ways. Levi-Strauss defines the concept clearly (and 
structurally): 
[A] structure consists of a model meeting with several requirements. . . . 
 First, the structure exhibits the characteristics of a system. It is made up of 
several elements, none of which can undergo a change without effecting 
changes in all the other elements. 
 Second, for any given model there should be a possibility of ordering a se-
ries of transformations resulting in a group of models of the same type. 
 Third, the above properties make it possible to predict how the model will 
react if one or more of its elements are submitted to certain modifications. 
Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology 279 (Claire Jabosen & Brooke 
Grundfest Schoepf trans., Basic Books 1963). 
164 See MacKinnon, supra note 21, at ix. “Marxism is the contemporary theoretical tra-
dition that—whatever its limitations—confronts organized social dominance, analyzes it in 
dynamic rather than static terms, identifies social forces that systematically shape social 
imperatives, and seeks to explain human freedom both within and against history.” Id. 
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causes by setting up identities between them that keep elements of the 
structural model together.165 
 Let me conclude this Part by anticipating some objections to my 
approach, particularly from critical communities in which I participate 
and which are properly suspicious of this sort of argument. For one, my 
argument rejects post-modernity’s Nicene Creed against essences by 
using what Janet Halley and Duncan Kennedy have classified as “para-
noid structuralism.”166 Indeed, the copula is the deep structure of 
paranoid logic.167 Halley notes that the copula may leave its users “en-
ergized, emboldened, fortified . . . . indignant and determined.”168 She 
warns, though, that the approach can alienate others: “its hammering 
insistence, its righteous wrath, will sound to you like scary, even crazy 
zeal.”169 So, while noting their value, Halley rejects the strongest ver-
sions of structuralism, including feminism.170 
                                                                                                                      
165 Janet Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism 
193 (2006). 
166 The argument in this article is chargeable with the “paranoid structuralism” that 
Halley and Kennedy describe. See Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Critique, 22 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 1147, 1169 (2007) (“The paranoid structuralist asks how unwanted things get repro-
duced, rather than how the organism sustains itself through time. The answer is paranoid 
because it emphasizes that “out there” forces or people or structures operate behind our 
backs . . . .”); see also Halley, supra note 165, at 191 (“[Presupposing] the covert impor-
tance of one’s favorite paranoid idea—or claiming to see it precisely [because of] its ab-
sence—can have the big downside of being, well, paranoid.”). Halley notes the risk of 
theoretical paralysis from feminist paranoid structuralism and provides a self-examination 
to test for paranoid structuralism. Id. at 187–207. 
167 I set out the copula around conceptual liquidation of sexual minorities most fully 
in my last article when outlining the structure of conceptual liquidation: 
[It includes] overt acts like physical harassment and ridicule, as well as the 
strategic omissions of straight supremacy: the shameful excitement of early 
sexual interest, the siege during adolescence, the search for self in literary 
and historical subtext, parental opprobrium and the resulting splitting of the 
self, institutionalized religious hostility, hostility from peers, one’s own hostil-
ity towards “militant” gays who implicate one’s own internalized repudiation, 
the risk that a national border will come between one and the object of one’s 
affection, heightened management of the quite real risks to career, frustrated 
family formation, deflationary progress narratives, ego conflicts from recon-
ciling self to professional commitments, and, although only anticipated dur-
ing life, the final insults at death. A complete taxonomy of [conceptual liqui-
dation] is impossible because its genius lies in its ability to turn any social 
moment into a theater for stigma. 
See Gabilondo, supra note 27, at 21–22 & nn.66–79 (citations omitted). 
168 Halley, supra note 165, at 194. 
169 Id. at 195. 
170 Halley notes: 
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 By essentializing, structuralist arguments also risk overlooking the 
range of constituencies in a legal question. For example, Angela Harris 
notes that a structural approach may essentialize women of color out of 
a theory of women.171 It is the danger of any single “monolithic” con-
ception of “women’s experience.”172 Women of color, says Harris, are 
likely to be excluded from strategically reductionist accounts of women’s 
experience.173 Bertha Hernandez has noted that critiques of reproduc-
tivism may also conflict with the values of Latina Catholics.174 
 For example, although neither Morrison nor Hernandez explicitly 
mention race, their disapproval of casual (and causal) coitus may in-
clude a veiled endorsement of the racist reproductive policies de-
nounced by Dorothy Roberts.175 Roberts objects to population polices 
                                                                                                                      
Of course it is no longer acceptable to “be a structuralist” in the strongest 
sense—that would be hopelessly naïve, almost as bad as being “essentialist” —
and almost no one does either any more if he or she can help it. Nevertheless 
subordination theories across the board, feminist ones being no exception, 
continue to have persistent recourse to an attitude of paranoid structuralism. 
Id. at 189. 
171 See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. 
L. Rev. 581, 585 (1990). 
172 Id. at 588 (“The notion that there is a monolithic ‘woman’s experience’ that can be 
described independent of other facets of experience like race, class, and sexual orienta-
tion is one I refer to . . . as ‘gender essentialism.’”). 
173 See id. at 589. Harris states: 
In my view, however, as long as feminists, like theorists in the dominant cul-
ture, continue to search for gender and racial essences, black women will 
never be anything more than a crossroads between two kinds of domination, 
or at the bottom of a hierarchy of oppressions; we will always be required to 
choose pieces of ourselves to present as wholeness. 
Id. 
174 Hernandez explains, “the potential (and unavoidable) conflict that can confront a 
predominantly Catholic group in being asked to embrace sexual minorities or to accept 
certain population-control based solutions to hunger and poverty.” Berta Esperanza Her-
nández-Truyol, Latina Multidimensionality and LatCrit Possibilities: Culture, Gender, and Sex, 53 
U. Miami L. Rev. 811, 813–14 (1999) (citation omitted). 
175 For example, Roberts has shown how racist control over African Americans has— 
depending on the historical context—favored either more or less reproduction depending 
on the interests of the dominant white class: 
Race completely changes the significance of birth control to the story of 
women’s reproductive freedom . . . . While slave masters forced Black women 
to bear children for profit, more recent policies have sought to reduce Black 
women’s fertility. Both share a common theme—that Black women’s child-
bearing should be regulated [for] social objectives. 
Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning 
of Liberty 56 (1997). 
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based on race rather than reproductivism, the latter being a value she 
endorses when arguing that black women have a special claim to the 
symbolic capital that comes from reproductivism “because they have 
historically been denied the dignity of their full humanity and iden-
tity.”176 She does object to the use of “citizens as instruments of the 
state” but this is not a general rejection of the reproductivism.177 In 
this view, reproduction is an exercise in collective self-help in the face 
of sustained, concerted attacks on dignity.178 
 The charge of essentialism might legitimately be brought against 
my argument too. Reproduction is over-determined: different hetero-
sexuals may or may not reproduce for any number of reasons. And it 
means different things to different people. My goal here, though, is 
only to identify one source of demand for children—demand for sym-
bolic value through heterosexuality. Presumably, other structural ele-
ments are also at work, including racialized differences in the taste for 
heterosexuality, something which I invite other scholars to consider. 
 Critiquing structuralist approaches, Halley also notes how they 
have contributed to a “deadlock in feminism” by leading to a form of 
intellectual paralysis.179 For example, she analyzes the emergence of 
                                                                                                                      
176 Id. at 302. Roberts sees reproduction as a transcendent human value: “The right to 
bear children goes to the heart of what it means to be human. The value we place on indi-
viduals determines whether we see them as entitled to perpetuate themselves in their chil-
dren.” Id. at 305. 
177 Id. at 306. Her view may leave room to some restraint on procreative liberty in the 
name of a future child’s welfare but the argument focuses on how racial opprobrium 
drives the social interpretation given to harm to offspring: 
Poor crack addicts and welfare mothers are punished for having babies be-
cause they fail to measure up to the state’s ideal of motherhood . . . not penal-
ized simply because they may harm their unborn children or because their 
childbearing will cost taxpayers money . . . [but rather] because the combina-
tion of their poverty, race, and marital status is seen to make them unworthy 
of procreating. 
See id. at 305. 
178 Roberts notes the psychic and political value of reproductive self-determination for 
overcoming the psychic sequellae of slavery: “The process of defining one’s self and de-
claring one’s personhood defies the denial of self-ownership inherent in slavery. This af-
firmation of personhood is especially suited for challenging the devaluation of Black 
motherhood underlying the regulation of Black reproduction.” See id. at 303. 
179 Halley, supra note 165, at 192. The crisis Halley describes is familiar to anyone ac-
tive in critical jurisprudential movements: 
Structuralist ambitions figure in these gestures as an ultimate fealty to tran-
scendence, a utopia, or a harmonic convergence that, if we were only smart 
and good enough, we would be able to produce out of the terrible conflictual 
material we have to work with. 
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“governance feminism,” which involves the reception of mediated 
forms of feminism into the official sector as an example of the porosity 
of power.180 She is right to note that “[b]y positing themselves as experts 
on women, sexuality, motherhood, and so on, feminists walk the halls 
of power.”181 The official sector, however, has not digested advocacy for 
sexual minorities to the same degree. Although structural claims may 
seem shrill or quaint in the context of women’s experience generally, 
they may still be relevant for sexual minorities. Being paranoid does not 
mean that they are not out to get you.182 
 Because of when critiques of heterosexual normativity became in-
stitutionalized in the academy, these critiques are sometimes seen as 
postmodernist. Relegating the analysis of heterosexuality to postmod-
ernism might imply that heterosexual complementarity fits into mod-
ernity. In fact, though, pre-modern views can “pass” as modern concep-
tions, as suggested in a recent Supreme Court case in which one Justice 
objected to the majority’s “ancient notions about women's place in the 
family” when upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.183 I 
use some post-modern sources to make what is really a conventionally 
modern argument, albeit one designed to oust pre-modern concep-
tions of modernity masquerading as the real thing. 
                                                                                                                      
 So it’s not just that the “race, class . . . ” mantra, deployed prescriptively, of-
ten obscures rather than illuminates the complexity of power in the social 
world. The moralized crisis that sustains it is so ritualized—is performed again 
and again with such Kabuki-like precision—that one could call it a deadlock in 
feminism. Paralysis again. 
Id. 
180 See id. at 20–22. 
181 Id. at 21. 
182 Nearly one-half of the world’s countries criminalize gay or lesbian sex between con-
senting adults. Int’l Lesbian and Gay Ass’n, State-sponsored Homophobia A World 
Survey of Laws Prohibiting Same Sex Activity Between Consenting Adults 4 (2007), 
http://www.ilga.org/statehomophobia/State_sponsored_homophobia_ILGA_07.pdf (identi-
fying such laws in eighty-five member countries of the United Nations). 
183 See 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. 2004); Gonzalez v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1649 (2007) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg’s dissent uses the word “ancient” rather than 
“premodern” but the idea is the same. Id. at 1649. She notes that the majority’s decision in 
Carhart is “alarming” and “reflects ancient notions about women’s place in the family and 
under the Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited.” Id. at 1641, 1649. 
Admonishing the decision, Ginsberg states, “If there is anything at all redemptive to be 
said of today’s opinion, it is that the Court is not willing to foreclose entirely a constitu-
tional challenge to the Act.” Id. at 1651. While she acknowledges that Carhart “does not go 
so far as to discard Roe or Casey,” she recognizes that the Court is “differently composed 
than it was when we last considered a restrictive abortion regulation, [and] is hardly faith-
ful to our earlier invocations of ‘the rule of law’ and the ‘principles of stare decisis.’” Id. at 
1652. 
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II. Perfecting Observer Status in Heterosexual Reproduction 
 This Part examines how and why the taste for heterosexuality is 
reproduced. The social construction of heterosexuality’s value, I assert, 
creates self-fulfilling demand on the part of parents and courts for the 
conspicuous reproduction of heterosexuality. Once this happens, the 
reproduction of (heterosexual) reproduction seems to propel itself. To 
explain how this comes to be, I use Pierre Bourdieu’s socioeconomic 
theory of reproduction, as supplemented with feminist and other sources 
on reproduction and heterosexuality. Read together, these sources let 
one peer into normative heterosexuality without falling into it.184 
 Section A introduces Bourdieu’s framework. Section B considers 
the mental structure which creates demand for the reproduction of 
heterosexuality as a practice and as a norm. Section C explains how 
children provide their parents with capital and how, in a heterosexual 
economy, parents correctly discount the value of a gay child. 
A. Bourdieu: the Individual as Cell of Social Reproduction 
 As part of his vast sociology on taste, education, and the French 
academy, Bourdieu examined the reproduction of social institutions 
and tastes.185 Commentators agree that his work could add “complete-
                                                                                                                      
184 As David Halperin has noted, 
[T]he project of shifting the discursive position of homosexuality from that of ob-
ject to subject does not constitute a mere attempt to reform sexual discourses. . . . 
The aim, rather, is to treat homosexuality as a position from which one can know, to 
treat it as a legitimate condition of knowledge. 
David M. Halperin, Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography 60 (1995). One of 
the few anthologies of critical heterosexuality studies is Thinking Straight: The Power, 
the Promise, and the Paradox of Heterosexuality (Chrys Ingraham ed., 2005). Fo-
cusing on heterosexuality and its discontents also avoids misplaced scrutiny. See, e.g., Mar-
tha M. Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage: An InterSEXional Approach, 75 Denv. U. L. Rev. 
1215, 1215 n.2 (1998) (“The danger of queer theorists applying constructionist analysis 
only to discuss gay and lesbian issues is that doing so deconstructs homosexuality leaving 
heterosexuality in its naturalized, superior position.”). 
185 See generally Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judge-
ment of Taste (Richard Nice trans., 1984) (1979) [hereinafter Bourdieu, Distinction]. 
His classic text on the subject is Pierre Bourdieu & Jean-Claude Passeron, Reproduc-
tion in Education, Society and Culture (Richard Nice trans., Sage Publications 1990 
ed.) (1977). Those who process information visually will especially appreciate the book’s 
schematic representations of how a person’s education and career transform elements of 
social capital and how, in the aggregate, these patterns of transformations contribute to 
class formation. Bourdieu’s trenchant analysis of the French higher education system will 
be of special interest to academics. See generally Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus 
(1988). 
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ness” to legal scholarship, especially on questions of agency and class.186 
One reason why this is so is because Bourdieu consciously overcame 
many methodological binaries.187 Integrating received oppositions is 
useful for a relatively new issue like the taste for heterosexuality, which 
may deserve its own theoretical structure. Bourdieu’s model is “struc-
tural” because it connects individual consciousness and action, social 
structure, and the reproduction of both.188 In this it has much in com-
mon with a Marxian analysis of “reproductive praxis” mentioned ear-
lier.189 Trained first as an ethnographer, however, Bourdieu saw class 
formation through the lens of the individual, one “thick” with motives 
and strategies, so, despite his protestations, his approach has some im-
portant things in common with the rational actor model.190 
 Bourdieu saw his work as a form of “genetic structuralism” which 
examined the origin of both mental and social structures and the joint 
                                                                                                                      
186 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943, 1020 
(1995) (noting the value of Bourdieu’s explanation of formal education as an agent of social 
construction). Lawrence Lessig has noted the exceptional coherence of Bourdieu’s explana-
tion of formal education as an agent of social construction. See id. at 973–74. He also uses 
Bourdieu’s concept of “social capital,” and praises how Bourdieu’s economic rhetoric con-
tributes more “completeness” than the “materialist” approach of Richard Posner and Tomás 
Philipson. Id. at 1004–05, 1020. Susan Carle points out that American legal theory has only 
barely begun to consider the implications of Bourdieu’s work on class, and she refers to 
Bordieu as a “master continental theorist of class.” Susan D. Carle, Theorizing Agency, 55 Am. 
U. L. Rev. 307, 392 (2005). A good place to begin a study of Bourdieu is Richard Terdiman’s 
translation of Bourdieu’s essay on law as a juridical field, of which the translator’s introduc-
tion is exceptionally lucid. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical 
Field, 38 Hastings L.J. 805, 805–13 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987). 
187 See Pierre Bourdieu, In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology 
34 (1990). According to Bourdieu, “Today’s sociology is full of oppositions, which my work 
often leads me to transcend—even if I don’t set out deliberately to do so.” Id. 
188 See generally Levi-Strauss, supra note 163. 
189 See Allman, supra note 62, at 203. 
190 See Craig Calhoun, Habitus, Field, and Capital: The Question of Historical Specificity, in 
Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives 55, 70–71 (Craig Calhoun et al., eds. 1993). 
Calhoun notes the affinity: 
Bourdieu’s theory does imply dynamism . . . at the level of the strategic actor . . . . 
That is, the motive force of social life is the pursuit of distinction, profit, power, 
wealth, and so on . . . . [D]espite his disclaimers, Bourdieu does indeed share a good 
deal with Gary Becker and other rational choice theorists. 
Id. For example, Bourdieu’s view that semi-conscious “dispositions” inform gain-seeking is 
consistent with the way that the new institutional economics reasons aspire to behavioral 
assumptions that better approximate how people act in fact, not theory. See, e.g., Oliver 
Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 44 (1985) (noting the use of 
bounded rather than idealized rationality in transaction cost economics because this as-
sumption better reflects “human nature as we know it”). 
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reproduction of each.191 I see his work as “Marxian behavioralism” be-
cause of its focus on individual action in the patterned reproduction of 
social structure.192 This article examines the relationship between pre-
natal biases and social and legal structure, so I use his framework be-
cause it maps these elements. Bourdieu’s preoccupation with the origin 
and reproduction of social structures is relevant to this article’s central 
goal: to demonstrate the existence of a socially-constructed preference 
(rewarded by law) which privileges heterosexuality and, at the same 
time, propels personal reproduction, thereby begetting begetting. 
 Catherine MacKinnon has criticized the way that some feminists 
have built on “the work of French men” while ignoring the reality of 
women’s lives.193 This may be true of followers of Bourdieu’s contem-
poraries, but I do not think that this criticism applies to this article. In 
fact, Bourdieu’s work encourages a critical move “from the model of 
reality to the reality of the model.”194 That said, it is true that he paid 
less attention to questions of sex and gender—an odd and unfortu-
                                                                                                                      
191 See Bourdieu, supra note 186, at 14. Bourdieu described his work this way: 
I would say that I am trying to develop a genetic structuralism: the analysis of 
objective structures – those of different fields – is inseparable from the analysis 
of the genesis, within biological individuals, of the mental structures which 
are to some extent the product of incorporation of social structures; insepa-
rable, too, from the analysis of the genesis of these social structures them-
selves. 
Id. 
192 Looking for original ways to span the divide between determinism and construc-
tionism is common to much contemporary scholarship. See, e.g., Judith Butler, Bodies 
That Matter: On The Discursive Limits of “Sex,” at x (1993) (“Such a willful and in-
strumental subject, one who decides on its gender, is clearly not its gender from the start 
and fails to realize that its existence is already decided by gender.”) (clarifying overly con-
structionist interpretations of her earlier work); Kyriakos Kontopoulos, The Logic of 
Social Structure passim (1993) (proposing theory of structural causation from “macro” 
levels through “meso” levels in order to reach “micro” behavior at the level of individuals); 
Carle, supra note 186, at 371–74 (arguing for the value of turn-of-the century classical 
pragmatist thought as an analytical framework in her comprehensive consideration of 
agency theory in social constructionist debates). 
193 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 687, 
702 (2000) (“Postmodern feminists seldom build on or refer to the real lives of real 
women directly; mostly, they build on the work of French men, if selectively and not very 
well.”). Indeed, MacKinnon notes how much of postmodernism developed from feminist 
and Marxian critiques of social dominance: “Postmodernism’s analysis of the social con-
struction of reality is stolen from feminism and the left but gutted of substantive content— 
producing Marxism without the working class, feminism without women.” Id. at 710. The 
same can be said for feminism’s legacy to postmodern art. See Holland Cotter, The Art of 
Feminism As It First Took Shape, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 2007, at E29 (“Much of what we call 
postmodern art has feminist art at its source.”). 
194 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice 39 (Richard Nice trans., 1990) (1980). 
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nate oversight considering that physical reproduction is the royal road 
to social reproduction, including inequality.195 In general, though, 
Marxian analysis of the sexual order has been somewhat limited.196 
 A particular virtue of Bourdieu’s approach is that by taking us be-
hind-the-scenes into the middle and upper classes, it avoids the classism 
of viewing only the reproduction of the poor as a social problem.197 It is 
true that reproductivism is regressive, with its costs, like infanticide, fal-
ling most heavily on the young, poor, and uninformed.198 As do others, 
I emphasize the importance of class when thinking about reproduc-
tion.199 A proper critique of natalism, however, should consider the role 
                                                                                                                      
195 However, “this substantive omission should not be taken to mean that Bourdieu’s 
theoretical apparatus does not necessarily have relevance for feminism.” Lisa Adkins, Intro-
duction: Feminism, Bourdieu and After, in Feminism After Bourdieu 3, 3 (Lisa Adkins & 
Beverly Skeggs eds., 2004). This volume is the best source on feminist applications of Bour-
dieu. 
196 There are a few prominent exceptions. See, e.g., Paul Robinson, The Freudian 
Left (1969) (studying the relationship between Marxism and psychoanalysis in the work 
of Wilhelm Reich, Geza Roheim, and Herbert Marcuse). Wilhelm Reich argued for a “sex-
economic morality” that integrated Freudian ideas about libido with Marxism. Wilhelm 
Reich, The Sexual Revolution: Toward a Self-Regulating Character Structure 
25–29 (Therese Pol trans., Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1974) (1945). 
197 The most extended example of this is Bourdieu’s charming examination of the 
class structure of cultural taste in contemporary French society. See generally Bourdieu, 
Distinction, supra note 185. It classifies and examines taste across social strata but pays 
special attention to the “petit-bourgeois” and its anguished relationship to the “bourgeoi-
sie.” For example, he notes that “one can contrast a bourgeois ethos of ease, a confident 
relation to the world and the self, which are thus experienced as necessary . . . with a petit-
bourgeois ethos of restriction through pretension, the voluntaristic rigour of the ‘called’ 
but not yet chosen . . . .” Id. at 339 (distinguishing between rising and falling sectors of the 
petit-bourgeois). Mapping the correspondence between French and U.S. class structure 
would require a more extended discussion, but I just want to highlight his sustained inter-
est in the sociology of the affluent. See also Pierre Bourdieu, Masculine Domination 101 
(Stanford Univ. Press 2001) (1998) [hereinafter Bourdieu, Masculine Domination] 
(“The women of the petit-bourgeoisie, who go to extremes in their attention to the care of 
the body . . . and more generally in their concern for ethical and aesthetic respectability, 
are the greatest victims of symbolic domination, but also the natural vectors for the relay-
ing of its effects towards the dominated categories.”). 
198 See Mary Overpeck, Epidemiology of Infanticide, in Infanticide: Psychosocial and 
Legal Perspectives on Mothers Who Kill 19, 24–25 (Margaret G. Spinelli ed., 2003) 
[hereinafter Infanticide]. Two of the most important risk factors for infanticide are the 
age of the mother and her education. Id. Infanticide research suffers from inadequate 
reporting, but some research has been conducted by state vital statistics agencies. See id. at 
19–20. One study of 2776 probable infant homicides found that infants at highest risk of 
infanticide are the second or subsequent children born to mothers under the age of sev-
enteen. Id. at 24. Infants of mothers who had not completed high school were eight times 
more likely to be killed than those of mothers with sixteen years of education, although 
this correlation also reflects the aforementioned risk factor of age. Id. at 25. 
199 See generally Franke, supra note 49. Dorothy Roberts has also criticized the way that 
advocacy for reproductive technologies disproportionately consumed by middle and up-
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of the reproduction of the affluent.200 After all, legal standards about 
family life may reflect bourgeois styles and interests to the detriment of 
others.201 Because wealth may insulate the rich and the very rich from 
some forms of status anxiety, it is in the middle and upper-middle 
classes where the challenge to improve social standing through repro-
ductive competition may emerge more clearly.202 
 Bourdieu’s model of social reproduction has three moving parts 
which are central to my argument: the accumulative self (“habitus”); 
the convertible capitals it seeks; and the exchange markets (“fields”) 
where it converts these capitals in contests with others.203 The following 
sections examine each of these concepts in the context of the taste for 
heterosexuality and its role as a crankshaft of heterosexual reproduc-
tion. 
B. Heterosexual Time-Inconsistency in the Habitus 
 At the heart of Bourdieu’s theory about social reproduction is a 
notion of a “future-projected, strategizing, accruing, exchange-value 
                                                                                                                      
per-middle class persons ignores the different reproductive needs of poorer women. See 
Roberts, supra note 175, at 56. 
200 Some suggest that heterosexual marriage strategies contribute materially to the re-
production of economic inequality: “Yet sorting on education, income, race, religion, and 
other characteristics in marriage is probably far more important in transmitting inequality 
than capital market restrictions on investments in human capital, neighborhood segrega-
tion, and the other variables usually emphasized.” Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, 
Social Economics Market Behavior in a Social Environment 34 (2000). 
201 Consider, for example, how concerns about meeting social expectations for dowry 
in India may encourage female infanticide for families of modest means: “[E]ven today, 
the birth of a daughter automatically triggers the pressure of saving a suitable dowry. If a 
family cannot provide a suitable dowry, it risks social ostracism. Among poor rural families, 
the persistence of female infanticide and sex-selective abortions of healthy female fetuses is 
attributable to this fear.” See Michelle Oberman, A Brief History of Infanticide and the Law, in 
Infanticide, supra note 198, at 3, 5. 
202 See supra note 197. And this class focus also makes the argument more directly rele-
vant to the members of the legal academy. 
203 See generally Bourdieu, Masculine Domination, supra note 197. This “invisible 
hand” of reproductivism substitutes in part for the concerted strategies noted by Bourdieu: 
The work of reproduction was performed, until a recent period, by three 
main agencies, the family, the church and the educational system, which were 
objectively orchestrated and had in common the fact that they acted on un-
conscious structures. The family undoubtedly played the most important part 
in the reproduction of masculine domination. . . . In fact the whole of 
learned culture, transmitted by the educational system . . . has never ceased, 
until a recent period, to convey archaic modes of thought. 
Id. at 85–86. 
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self.”204 The self works through the “habitus,” a reservoir of skills, tastes, 
and dispositions that reflect prior learning and socialization.205 The 
taste for heterosexuality is one of those “dispositions” which comes to 
reside in the habitus through “learning and socialization.” Though not, 
as far as I know, framed in such terms, this basic insight is hardly origi-
nal, as suggested by scholarship about homophobia. My goal here is to 
suggest how this habital disposition shows up in valuations of potential 
children. 
 Humanities scholar Lee Edelman has performed the most de-
tailed analysis of how reproductivism has been “soft-wired” into het-
erosexual consciousness as a symbol which drives many heterosexuals 
to organize time through “reproductive futurism.”206 He posits a con-
flict in the minds of heterosexuals between two symbols.207 The domi-
nant symbol is the “Child.”208 In other words, not a child-in-fact, this is 
a “when, if, and as-issued” child whose imputed interests reach back 
from an equally imagined future to call the shots in the present.209 
The Child “marks the fetishistic fixation of heteronormativity: an erotic-
ally charged investment in the rigid sameness of identity that is central 
to the compulsory narrative of reproductive futurism.”210 (Not an easy 
sentence, granted, but understanding it is worth the effort.) I have 
added emphasis to point out that this process involves the collective 
regulation of libido—that of the parent, the child, and third parties 
who bear the attendant social costs and benefits—for the sake of re-
producing the same social arrangements.211 
 Against the Child, the death drive emerges as a nihilist force asso-
ciated with the homosexual; it disrupts future-looking reproduction by 
suggesting that the present may make claims of its own, notwithstand-
                                                                                                                      
204 Beverley Skeggs, Exchange, Value and Affect: Bourdieu and the “The Self,” in Feminism 
After Bourdieu, supra note 195, at 75, 83. Skeggs does an excellent job of distinguishing 
this exchange-value of the self from competing theoretical models. Id. at 77–83. 
205 Bourdieu took the habitus from previous theorists and made it “generative”: “I was 
very close to Chomsky, in whom I found the same concern to give to practice an active, 
inventive intention . . . . I wanted to insist on the generative capacities of dispositions, it being 
understood that these are acquired, socially constituted dispositions.” See Bourdieu, supra 
note 187, at 13. 
206 See generally Edelman, supra note 19. 
207 See id. at 3. 
208 See id. at 2–4. Edelman capitalizes “child” to emphasize its totemic power. 
209 See id. 
210 Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
211 This symbolic operation involves managing sex energy (hence “erotically” and “fe-
tishistic”). The goal of the operation is to reproduce “sameness,” thus my corollary that the 
Child—like the heterosexual parent—is straight too. 
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ing the imaginary future of imaginary children.212 These symbolic con-
flicts collapse distinct moments in time (the future of the imaginary 
Child and everyone else’s present), reflecting a time disjunction similar 
to the time confusion of heterosexual coitus discussed earlier in con-
nection with Morrison and Hernandez.213 It is this ricocheting backward 
and forward that may keep some heterosexuals permanently locked 
into a time disorder.214 This time confusion makes a market for repro-
duction by keeping heterosexuals from anticipating the forward costs 
of reproduction. The symbolic capital bribe which cases like Morrison 
and Hernandez offer—however illusory it may turn out to be in prac-
tice—also keeps some heterosexuals from properly pricing the value of 
the present and, perhaps, the value of relationships with existing peo-
ple who do not enter into the reproductive calculus. 
 It is my contention—extending Edelman’s argument—that this 
totemic Child is demonstrably heterosexual—at the level of symbol— 
because that sexual orientation conforms with the overall logic of re-
production—as currently understood—and, therefore, produces the 
most social approval. This symbolic heterosexual Child would be an 
example of one of those “internalized categories” which Bourdieu 
identifies as the building block of social and natural “realities.”215 Sup-
port for the claim that the symbolic Child which Edelman discusses is 
itself heterosexual comes from the reactions of parents to the early 
signs that a child may be homosexual. For example, Dr. Nicolosi’s guide 
                                                                                                                      
212 Edelman, supra note 19, at 9. “The drive—more exactly, the death drive—holds a 
privileged place in this book. . . . [T]he death drive names what the queer, in the order of 
the social, is called forth to figure: the negativity opposed to every form of social viability.” 
Id. 
213 See supra notes 118–133 and accompanying text. 
214 “Politics, then, in opposing itself to the negativity of such a [death] drive, gives us 
history as the continuous staging of our dream of eventual self-realization by endlessly 
reconstructing, in the mirror of desire, what we take to be reality itself.” Edelman, supra 
note 19, at 10. 
215 See Bourdieu, Masculine Domination, supra note 197, at 121. When explaining 
how it is that social reform movements accomplish lasting results, Bourdieu emphasizes 
the need to “subvert” the internalized schema of representation: 
To accomplish a durable change in representations, [symbolic subversion] 
must perform and impose a durable transformation of the internalized cate-
gories (schemes of thought) which, through upbringing and education, con-
fer the status of self-evident, necessary, undisputed natural reality, within the 
scope of their validity, on the social categories that they produce. 
Id. Here, preconsciousness or some form of subliminal consciousness in the form of par-
ents’ hopeful but unwarranted expectations about potential children informs the experi-
ence of subsequent actual children who come into being. See id. 
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for parents on preventing homosexuality in (existing) children in-
cludes detailed guidelines about what parents can do in the first years 
of a child’s life to mitigate the risk of incipient homosexuality.216 Edel-
man’s main point is about how this mental and social system prejudices 
sexual minorities; my point is that heterosexuals also suffer in this sys-
tem.217 
 Habital heterosexuality involves the reproduction of itself. That 
is, because it drags learned preferences from the past into the pre-
sent, the habitus is a structure broker that mediates between former 
and future states of the world through strategies. It is in this sense that 
the habitus makes possible the reproduction of reproduction, thereby 
creating demand for heterosexuality and its symbolic value. 
 The heterosexualized habitus needs a forum in which to seek gain 
and, in Bourdieu’s model, these capital production and exchange mar-
kets are called “fields.”218 “Bourdieu understands the social world to 
                                                                                                                      
216 See Nicolosi & Nicolosi, supra note 48, at 33–53 (suggesting steps for reparative 
intervention by parents in the development of what may be a “prehomosexual boy”). The 
references in these guidelines to the felt experience of these boys of their “genderless-
ness.” are open to other readings. Indeed, perhaps unwittingly, Nicolosi’s idea of a child’s 
“genderlessness,” the feeling of not being particularly invested in the behaviors and iden-
tity ascribed to one’s chromosomal sex status also lends support to the autonomy of gen-
der from sex and sexual orientation, a refreshing perspective given that progressive dis-
course now uses “gender” when it means “chromosomal sex” (and, in so doing, forecloses 
the transformative potential of gender). During the last decade or so, “gender” has come 
to substitute for “sex” on official forms (especially those with progressive aspirations) and 
in academic and popular discourse. I think this substitution makes people feel “modern” 
or hip. In fact, though, it is a reactionary move from the point of view of gender politics. 
Gender starts from the idea that identity and behavior do not correlate with chromosomal 
sex status. The sex spectrum runs from “male” to “female” while, in parallel fashion, the 
gender spectrum runs from “butch” to “femme.” By substituting “gender” for “sex” the 
former loses its power as a reminder of the false correlates between sex and identity. Prop-
erly conceived, gender is nothing more than a transitional concept that—correctly— in-
cludes the seeds of its own eventual irrelevance. This idea is outside the scope of this arti-
cle but too important not to mention. 
217 See generally Edelman, supra note 19. 
[O]ur enjoyment of liberty is eclipsed by the lengthening shadow of a Child 
whose freedom to develop undisturbed by encounters, or even by the threat 
of potential encounters, with an “otherness” of which its parents, its church, 
or the state do not approve . . . terroristically holds us all in check and deter-
mines that political discourse conform to the logic of a narrative wherein his-
tory unfolds as a future envisioned for a Child who must never grow up. 
Id. at 21. 
218 See Bourdieu, supra note 187, at 87–88. For legal academics not yet familiar with 
Bourdieu’s framework, it can be grasped intuitively by thinking about our profession. As 
teachers, we cultivate particular dispositions in students, such as “thinking like a lawyer” 
and absorbing specialized course content to produce (seemingly) seamless performances. 
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comprise differentiated, but overlapping, fields of action, for example, 
the economic field, the political field, the legal field, and so on.”219 
Fields precede and give rise to “games” by setting up the economic in-
terests that animate more targeted competition among relevant ac-
tors.220 Embedded in this statement is the idea that games emerge as a 
                                                                                                                      
Unceasing calculation is part of the tenure track, where daily strategies are crafted (and 
concealed, perhaps) in a countdown to one or two important future decisions by senior 
faculty, a process during which one may have to make a separate peace despite collective 
interests as faculty. 
Reproduction and exchange figure prominently in many more of our customary prac-
tices: expounding one’s views through articles, conferences, and media appearances; ask-
ing prospective colleagues in their interviews versions of “Why aren’t you me?”; adding to 
the reputation of one’s home institution; and cultivating ideas, disciplines, and disciples. 
Being cited is a key form of reproduction, hence citation markets (and cartels) where fac-
ulty provide price support for each other’s work. The promotion and tenure process—and 
the pageantry of appointments—is a clear site of conflicts over reproductive projects. Just 
ask anyone who has served on an appointments committee and has noticed a colleague 
gush at an applicant with a shared distinction: rank, clerkship, or attendance at one of the 
“thirty schools in the Top Ten.” (The phrase belongs to my College of Law colleague, Tom 
Baker.) Academic salaries being what they are, economic capital (“financial” is a better 
word since all forms of capital are economic) matters less in academe than cultural, social, 
and symbolic capitals, although marginal differences in merit increases, negligible to be-
gin with, can fuel controversy. 
Pre-tenure, article placement and scholarship reviews allocate cultural capital, both in 
one’s home institution (where status may be marked-to-market) and extramurally. Con-
sider academics huddled around a credential, mentor, or prized social network or signal-
ing social standing in an asterisked footnote by thanking a particular reader, regardless of 
whether or not that reader’s reactions were seriously considered. A law review article is a 
bid for the symbolic capital of a judge, legislature, or another scholar or critic. Recognition 
is key to symbolic capital, hence the appeal of titles and chairs and the habit of running 
serial Lexis searches for one’s own name (guilty). The struggle over the power to name and 
classify (“the theory effect”) is the bread-and-butter of much academic conflict. Faculty 
meetings are one forum for these conflicts, with opportunities for serving the self through 
institutionally-framed discourses and the small, but important, joy of blocking an oppo-
nent’s capital strategy. Few things exemplify the symbolic power to create binding status 
and power through “naming” as does the power of a promotion and tenure committee 
when considering an application for tenure. 
Bourdieu emphasized law as the primary engine of symbolic capital, but nonlegal 
mechanisms also allocate legitimacy; consider the roles of the Carnegie Foundation and 
U.S. News and World Report in the faculty habitus. These two institutions make possible our 
ordinal fixations, including the “trading up” practices involved in maximizing article 
placement and the sense of knowing one’s place, especially when wearing a nametag at the 
Marriot Wardman. 
219 Lisa Adkins, Reflexivity: Freedom or Habit of Gender, in Feminism After Bourdieu, su-
pra note 195, at 191, 193. 
220 It is fields that make possible the emergence of interests, and, hence, games: “The 
existence of a specialized . . . field is correlative with the existence of specific stakes . . . . 
[I]nterest is at once a condition of the functioning of a field (a scientific field, the field of 
haute couture, etc), in so far as it is what ‘gets people moving’, what makes them . . . com-
pete and struggle . . . .” See Bourdieu, supra note 187, at 87–88. 
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function of field dynamics.221 Courts make and police fields for games 
through judicial review, which can empower courts to structure and 
restructure basic social arrangements (for example, marriage).222 The 
main field which this article considers is physical reproduction. Cases 
like Morrison and Hernandez help promote investment in this field by 
rewarding acts of coital recklessness with the special rights of marriage. 
C. Children as Capital 
 Faced with one risk and reward scenario after another, “the habitus 
always works with a perception of future value and accumulation.”223 
What the habitus wants is what Bourdieu classifies as “multiform and 
convertible” capital, the main types of which are social, cultural, eco-
nomic, and symbolic capital.224 Before explaining how a child provides 
these capitals—and how, in a heterosexual social economy, the return 
from a straight child might exceed that from a gay one—let me define 
them. 
 “Economic capital is wealth either inherited or generated from 
interactions between the individual and the economy . . . .”225 Cultural 
capital takes the form of educational accomplishment, as reflected in 
credentials.226 “Social capital is generated through social processes 
between the family and wider society and is made up of social net-
                                                                                                                      
221 Here Bourdieu addresses time before the first period of a game: 
[T]he inclination to play the economic game, to invest in the economic game 
which is itself the product of a certain economic game, is at the very basis of 
the existence of this game. This is something forgotten by every form of 
economism. Economic production functions only in so far as it first produces 
a belief in the value of its products . . . and it must also produce a belief in the 
value of the activity of production itself . . . . 
Id. at 89. 
222 While many law and economics arguments do a good job of explaining how games 
create incentives for players, these arguments do not always address why or how these 
games come to be in the first place. Bourdieu offers such an explanation, however, 
through an argument about interests: “Unlike the natural, ahistorical or generic interest 
referred to by economists, interest in my view, is an investment in a game, any game, an 
investment which is the condition of entry into this game and which is simultaneously 
created and reinforced by the game.” Id. at 48. 
223 See Skeggs, supra note 204, at 85. 
224 See Calhoun, supra note 190, at 69–70. 
225 Diane Reay, Gendering Bourdieu’s Concepts of Capitals? Emotional Capital, Women and 
Social Class, in Feminism After Bourdieu, supra note 195, at 57, 57. 
226 See Calhoun, supra note 190, at 70. 
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works.”227 Friendship by the abacus (that is, a quid pro quo calcula-
tion) pervades much social life because friendship can involve gain. 
 Symbolic capital is key to normative heterosexuality because this 
type of capital includes social approval.228 “Symbolic power is the power 
to make things with words”229 and is essentially unstable.230 The family 
is “the guardian of symbolic capital.”231 Law produces much symbolic 
capital through official determinations, like those defining the scope of 
marriage or the extent of parental authorities.232 These legal determi-
nations confer “upon a [particular] perspective an absolute, universal 
value, thus snatching it from a relativity that is by definition inherent in 
every point of view . . . .”233 For example, Devon Carbado makes a form 
of symbolic capital argument when noting that opening marriage to 
                                                                                                                      
227 Reay, supra note 225, at 57. 
228 Symbolic capital includes social approval in all of its manifestations: 
Authority, knowledge, prestige, reputation, academic degrees, debts of gratitude owed 
by those to whom we have given gifts or favors: all these are forms of symbolic capital. 
Such symbolic capital can be readily convertible into the more traditional form of eco-
nomic capital. The exchange value of symbolic capital, while it cannot be stated to the 
penny, is continuously being estimated and appraised by every individual possessing or 
coming into contact with it. The relevance of a notion of symbolic capital to the study 
of an important professional field like the juridical is considerable. 
See Bourdieu, supra note 186, at 812. 
229 Pierre Bourdieu, Social Space and Symbolic Power, 7 Soc. Theory 14, 23 (1989). Sym-
bolic power turns on classification and naming: “[T]he words, the names which construct 
social reality as much as they express it, are the stake par excellence of political struggle, 
which is a struggle to impose the legitimate principle of vision and division, i.e., a struggle 
over the legitimate exercise of what I call the ‘theory effect.’” Id. at 20–21. 
230 See Bourdieu, supra note 187, at 93. Bourdieu notes the “essential instability of 
symbolic capital which, being based on reputation, opinion and representation . . . can be 
destroyed by suspicion and criticism, and is particularly difficult to transmit and to objec-
tify.” Id. 
231 Id. Bourdieu makes the observation in the context of the family’s relationship to re-
ligion and the state when he notes “the constant, explicit support that the family, that 
guardian of symbolic capital, receives from churches and from law.” See id. The court in 
Hernandez alludes to this symbolic capital. See 855 N.E.2d at 7 (“Beyond this, [heterosexual 
couples] receive the symbolic benefit, or moral satisfaction, of seeing their relationships 
recognized by the State.”). 
232 What Bourdieu says about state-granted titles generally is true also about marriage: 
Official nomination, that is, the act whereby someone is granted a title, a socially 
recognized qualification, is one of the most typical expressions of that monopoly 
over legitimate symbolic violence which belongs to the state or its representatives 
. . . . As an official definition of an official identity, it frees its holder from the sym-
bolic struggle of all against all by imposing the universally approved perspective. 
See Bourdieu, supra note 187, at 135. 
233 Id. at 21. 
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homosexuals would reduce its premium as a symbol.234 It is the desire 
to hold on to this symbolic premium which has led defenders of 
straight supremacy—when their backs are against the wall—to concede 
the economic substance of marriage to homosexuals (through civil un-
ions) but not the symbolic franchise of marriage. Morrison and Herandez 
add symbolic capital to heterosexual reproduction by converting a het-
erosexual social ill—unintended pregnancy—into a warrant for a spe-
cial right. And the flip-side of this subsidy is the “symbolic violence” 
which the opinions perform on homosexuals.235 
 What kind of capital could a child provide to a parent? The answer 
is obvious in economies in which children provide the promise of wage 
returns from labor.236 In other economies, other forms of capital must 
be considered. Though Gary Becker comes from a different methodo-
logical tradition, his work complements Bourdieu’s model of a capital-
seeking habitus. Becker notes that reproduction involves a discretion-
ary lifestyle choice by an individual to acquire a “consumption good.”237 
Becker’s model assumes a pair consisting of a female and a male.238 
The all-in cost (or benefit) of having a child, says Becker, is the present 
value of all anticipated inflows minus the present value of all antici-
                                                                                                                      
234 See Carbado, supra note 43, at 96. (“[T]o the extent that lesbian and gay marriages 
are legalized, the “value” of heterosexual marriage—its cultural, political, and social cur-
rency—is diminished. Part of the perceived value of marriage as an institution derives 
from its heterosexual exclusivity. . . . The right to marriage must be heterosexually 
earned.”) 
235 The particular form of insult derived from reading cases like Morrison and Hernan-
dez involves what Pierre Bourdieu considered “symbolic” or “gentle” violence. Bourdieu, 
Masculine Domination, supra note 197, at 1–2 (“And I have also seen masculine domina-
tion . . . as the prime example of this paradoxical submission, an effect of what I call sym-
bolic violence, a gentle violence, imperceptible and invisible even to its victims, exerted for 
the most part through the purely symbolic channel of communication and cognition . . . 
or even feeling.”). A glib and callous dissent from a Massachusetts opinion on same-sex 
marriage provides a typical example. See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 
565, 572 n.1 (2004) (Sosman, J., dissenting) (“The insignificance of according a different 
name to the same thing has long been recognized: ‘What’s in a name?/That which we call 
a rose/By any other name would smell as sweet . . . .’”) (quoting William Shakespeare, 
Romeo and Juliet, act 2, sc. 2)). I am particularly grateful to Frank Valdés for his advice 
on negotiating symbolic violence in legal decisions while reading them. 
236 See generally Schultz, supra note 72. 
237 See Becker, Fertility, supra note 1, at 210. “For most parents, children are a source of 
psychic income or satisfaction, and, in the economist’s terminology, children would be 
considered a consumption good. Children may sometimes provide money income and are 
then a production good as well.” Id. 
238 See Becker, Family, supra note 1, at 38 n.3 (referencing “a household with one man 
and one woman”). The only examples that he provides reflect this configuration. 
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pated outlays.239 Here, “income” refers not primarily to money income 
(although this is so when children act as an income reserve from which 
aged parents may draw), but to various forms of psychic income too. 
The costs of reproduction also involve both money and psychic costs, 
although children can reduce their net cost to the family unit by pro-
viding services.240 
 If this present value is a negative number (the costs exceed the in-
come), the child is a consumer durable; if the present value is a positive 
number (the anticipated income exceeds the cost) the child is a pro-
ducer durable.241 This present value also includes a time-discounted 
“dynastic utility function” that measures the income of future descen-
dants.242 Unlike most other commodities, however, “[c]hildren are usu-
ally not purchased but are self-produced by each family, using market 
goods and services and the own time of parents, especially of moth-
ers.”243 
 According to Becker, it is “complementarity” in the sex-based dif-
ferences between the heterosexual male and the heterosexual female 
that makes cross-sex pairing more efficient than other arrange-
ments.244 In this view, sex-based division of labor reflects natural effi-
ciencies in gestation and child-rearing.245 Indeed, he argues for a bio-
logical basis for preferring cross-sex households over other types.246 
                                                                                                                      
239 See Becker, Fertility, supra note 1, at 213. More technically, the cost of a child “equals 
the present value of expected outlays plus the imputed value of the parents’ services, mi-
nus the present value of the expected money return plus the imputed value of the child’s 
services.” Id. 
240 See id. 
241 Id. 
242 See Becker, Family, supra note 1, at 156. “By relating the utility of children to their 
own consumption and to the utility of their children, we obtain a dynastic utility function 
that depends on the consumption and number of descendants in all generations.” Id. The 
model assumes that parents are altruistic toward their children. Id. at 155. 
243 Id. at 138. Becker explains private demand for children and patterns between the 
quantity and quality of children (as measured by parental investment in education). Id. He 
defines demand as “the number of children desired when there are no obstacles to the 
production or prevention of children.” Id. at 141. 
244 Becker, Family, supra note 1, at 39. Becker’s argument makes no moral judgments 
about arrangements other than a cross-sex pair, but stylized examples like this may confer 
symbolic value on the model: “Complementarity [between heterosexual men and hetero-
sexual women] implies that households with men and women are more efficient than 
households with only one sex, but because both sexes are required to produce certain 
commodities complementarity reduces the sexual division of labor in the allocation of 
time and investments.” Id. 
245 Id. at 37–48. 
246 Id. at 39. The argument also reflects the classic use of analogies from nonhuman 
sexual arrangements, a point explored in greater detail later: 
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The biological argument rests on analogies to the “naturalness” of 
sexual reproduction by nonhuman animals.247 (There is also some 
interesting countervailing zoological research that challenges deter-
minism by studying non-reproductive sex in nonhuman animals.)248 
This is akin to the biological determinism behind some of the legal 
arguments brought by the state in the cases discussed earlier.249 (I am 
not attributing to Becker’s arguments any explicit normativity.250 Ver-
sions of the “heterosexual complementarity” arguments, however, are 
used in Morrison and Hernandez to justify reserving the special legal 
rights of marriage as a reward for reckless heterosexual coitus.)251 
 My contention is that babies and children provide parents with 
social and symbolic capital by enhancing reputation in important 
networks. Such gains produce psychic income from individual align-
ment with widely-held norms. For example, sociologist Viviana Zelizer 
has pointed out that, while their financial value dropped during the 
                                                                                                                      
Consequently, biological differences in comparative advantage between the 
sexes explain not only why households typically have both sexes, but also why 
women have usually spent their time bearing and rearing children and engag-
ing in other household activities, whereas men have spent their time in mar-
ket activities. 
Id. 
247 According to Becker, humans reproduce in much the same way as all vertebrates: 
“Sexual reproduction along these lines is all but universal among vertebrates: not only 
mammals, but also fish, reptiles, birds, and amphibians reproduce sexually.” Id. at 37. 
248 See Bruce Bagemihl, Biological Exuberance: Animal Homosexuality and 
Natural Diversity 168 (1999) (“What many people fail to realize is that reproduction 
itself often occupies a peripheral position in animal life—either being a ‘marginal’ activity 
among apparently heterosexual animals, or else a common activity among seemingly 
‘marginal’ animals such as those involved in homosexuality.”). 
249 See, e.g., Baker, 744 A.2d 864, 909. For example, the state’s argument in Baker uses 
the concept of biological complementarity between man and woman to show that mar-
riage is essentially heterosexual. “The State contends that (1) marriage unites the rich 
physical and psychological differences between the sexes; (2) sex differences strengthen 
and stabilize a marriage; (3) each sex contributes differently to a family unit and to society. 
Id. at 909; see also Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 26 (favorably citing O’Connor v. O’Connor, 253 
N.E.2d 250, 258 (Ind. 1969) (“Through the institution of marriage, biological drives are 
directed into channels of socially accepted activity . . . .”)); Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 15, ( J. 
Graffeo, concurring) (“The binary nature of marriage--its inclusion of one woman and 
one man--reflects the biological fact that human procreation cannot be accomplished 
without the genetic contribution of both a male and a female.”). 
250 To the credit of Becker’s work, it clearly distinguishes between efficiency analysis 
and other values like social justice. For example, he points out that “an efficient division of 
labor is perfectly consistent with exploitation of women by husbands and parents—a ‘pat-
rimony’ system—that reduces [women’s] well-being and their command of their lives.” 
Becker, Family, supra note 1, at 4. 
251 See Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7. 
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nineteenth century due to child labor laws, children became “eco-
nomically ‘worthless’ but emotionally ‘priceless.’”252 The type of in-
come which children provided shifted from economic to what Bour-
dieu would probably consider symbolic.253 Social economist Thorsten 
Veblen coined the concept of “conspicuous consumption” to explain 
what he saw as the downward drift of taste from the upper to lower 
classes, who tried to enhance their status by consuming goods associ-
ated with the wealthy.254 As imagined by Veblen, spending money on 
the right goods would let a person consume “up” beyond his actual 
class. In the case of conspicuous reproduction which I suggest, having 
children does not enhance one’s financial status but, rather, provides 
social approval, including validation of one’s identity.255 
 Although the realities of raising a child may involve substantial sac-
rifice on the part of a parent and symbolic detriment, part of the payoff 
from having children is the symbolic capital from the social approval 
                                                                                                                      
252 Viviana A. Zelizer, Pricing The Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value 
of Children 3, 6 (1985). 
253 See id. 
254 “Conspicuous consumption of valuable goods is a means of reputability to the gen-
tleman of leisure.” Id. at 64. The less affluent have fewer resources for leisure but their 
taste resembles that of the affluent because “the upper class extends its coercive influence 
with but slight hindrance down through the social structure of the lowest strata.” Id. at 70. 
This is too simple; which is why I prefer Bourdieu’s more nuanced appreciation of the 
dynamics of taste within the middle classes. See discussion supra note 202. Thorsten Veblen 
introduced the concept of a status good in 1989. See Thorsten Veblen, A Theory of the 
Leisure Class (New York, MacMillan (1899); Jonathan Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Ca-
nal Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Thesis, 91 Va. 
L. Rev. 1381, 1388–91 (2005) (citing Thorsten Veblen’s concept of status goods). Veblen’s 
work anticipated much of the current recognition in economics for the impact of peer 
valuation on individual consumption, as Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy note with sur-
prise: “We were surprised to discover, upon rereading Thorsten Veblen’s influential Theory 
of the Leisure Class (1934), that he anticipated many of our results, although he does not 
make a systematic analysis . . . . [H]e particularly emphasizes behavior that conveys signals 
about one’s wealth, that is, ‘conspicuous consumption,’ to use his famous phrase.” See 
Becker & Murphy, supra note 200, at 5. 
255 With regard to sex identity, for example, one infertility researcher concludes that 
infertility leads men and women to revise their own sex self-concept: 
Those who do not conceive after an extended effort, however, begin to ques-
tion images [of their sex role] they find themselves unable to live up to. . . . 
Everyone [of the several hundred subjects] was asked the question, Has your 
identity as a woman/man changed as a result of experiencing infertility? All 
women and most men responded affirmatively . . . . 
Gay Becker, The Elusive Embryo: How Women and Men Approach New Reproduc-
tive Technologies 29 (2000) (citation omitted). 
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and enhanced social status which initially and automatically result.256 
Adrienne Rich anticipates the analysis: “A child can be used as a sym-
bolic credential, a sentimental object, a badge of self-righteousness.”257 
As symbol, the decision to reproduce may be read to signal maturity, 
sexual self-regulation, and social responsibility, all of which are open to 
other readings. Some may read the “credential” as an expression of ma-
turity and an assumption by the parent of the complex inter-temporal 
responsibilities produced by something with even more long-term vari-
ability than a floating-rate mortgage. Another way to read having a baby 
is a commitment by the parent to sexual self-regulation, most obviously 
in the form of compliance with the incest taboo. Such a reading is con-
sistent with Edelman’s analysis of reproductive futurism as a mechanism 
of responsible sublimation of libido.258 Interpreting reproduction as 
suggesting sexual self-regulation seems odd in light of the sexual reck-
lessness addressed by Morrison and Hernandez and the awkward truth 
about child sexual abuse—that it seems to be mostly a family affair, de-
spite the moral panic about unrelated sexual predators.259 Equally odd 
is the interpretation that having a child represents a form of social re-
sponsibility, given that having babies tends to shift energy away from 
the public and onto the brood, whose priorities must come first. 
 In a social economy where a child can function as a status good, a 
gay child may be worth less because it impairs the parent’s dynastic util-
ity function.260 The gay child may cut off the parent’s reproductive am-
                                                                                                                      
256 Reproduction may also involve symbolic detriment, such as the risk of employment 
discrimination based on the possibility that a woman will become pregnant. 
257 Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as an Experience and Institu-
tion, at xxiv (1986) (offering an account of situated theory of motherhood and patriar-
chy). 
258 See Edelman, supra note 19, at 4. 
259 Although reporting of sexual abuse, particularly of boys, remains incomplete, 
much—perhaps most—of this abuse occurs in the family. See Mic Hunter, Abused Boys: 
The Neglected Victims of Sexual Abuse 21 (1990) (suggesting that 75%–95% of child 
sexual abuse is perpetrated by someone known or related to the child). In this case, the 
symbolic subsidy given that the family may keep the truth about these practices from 
emerging. For example, some sexual abuse “treatment professionals claim they do not 
bring up the subject of incest, because they don’t want to insult the client by implying that 
he might have come from ‘that kind of family.’” Id. at 29.; see also David Finklehor & Larry 
Baron, High-Risk Children in David Finkelhor et al., A Sourcebook on Child Sexual 
Abuse 60, 78–79 (1990) (summarizing prevalence studies of child sexual abuse, including 
those of the special risks of sexual abuse to girls in families with a stepfather). 
260 When modeling how parent-investors react to their children, Becker posits a dis-
tinction between perceived “normal” orientations consistent with sex-based “biology” and 
“deviant” orientations of children who buck statistically-based expectations based on sex. 
Becker, Family, supra note 1, at 40. He suggests that parental investment in children of 
the latter sort involves risk: “Investments in ‘deviant’ children, on the other hand, conflict 
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bitions, “corrupting the blood” or reducing the likelihood of genetic 
transmission and accumulation through that child.261 The gay child 
may produce less social capital in networks where the parent may have 
some explaining to do, for example, to his or her own parents, who may 
have their own concerns about dynastic utility.262 
 The way that some parents treat their sexual minority children 
suggests such discounting.263 The high suicide rate among sexual mi-
nority children may reflect a parent’s “downgrade” of a child from in-
vestment to sub-investment grade.264 And the ordinary instability of 
heterosexual pairings cited by Morrison and Hernandez may be more 
pointed against sexual minority children, exposed to targeted neglect 
from disappointed parent-investors.265 Modest advances in reducing 
animus against homosexuals have (quite correctly) sounded the alarm 
that tolerance will cause the social market value of investments in het-
erosexuality to drop.266 Small wonder that some parents mobilize 
                                                                                                                      
with their biology, and the net outcome for them is not certain.” Id. His use of the word 
“deviance” suggests no moral judgment, just a statistical one. Id. at 40 n.4. The same logic 
would also suggest discounted parental investment in homosexual children. Becker notes 
that “in this analysis parents and society are not irrational, nor do they willingly discrimi-
nate against deviants.” Id. at 41. Obviously, the same cannot be said about parents who 
possess the taste for heterosexuality. 
261 This may be part of what parents “blame” themselves for when a child is gay. Cf., 
Carbado, supra note 43, at 120 (“The parents of heterosexuals do not love them ‘in spite 
of’ their sexual orientation, and parents do not blame themselves for their children’s het-
erosexuality.”). 
262 “Having a gay or lesbian child reflects not only on the child but the entire family. 
For one thing, it also alters the parents’ social status.” Ruskola, supra note 43, at 321 (not-
ing a straight parent’s complaint that his son’s homosexuality compromised the family’s 
social standing). 
263 “The legal system’s complacency regarding the emotional abuse of queer youth also 
results from notions of parents’ rights.” Martin, supra note 43, at 189. The effects of paren-
tal abuse in sexual minority children also include suicide, homelessness, substance abuse, 
sex work, and contraction of HIV. Id. at 174–79. 
264 See Arriola, supra note 64, at 438–39 (noting increased risk of suicide among sexual 
minority youth). See generally Stephen T. Russell & Kara Joyner, Adolescent Sexual Orientation 
and Suicide Risk: Evidence from a National Study, 91 Am. J. Pub. Health 1276 (2001) (suggest-
ing that sexual minority youths are more likely to contemplate suicide than their peers). 
265 See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 43 (concluding that reparative “therapy” should be inter-
preted judicially as child abuse). After the American Psychiatric Association repudiated the 
notion of homosexuality as a disorder, “gender identity disorder” emerged largely as a diag-
nostic category to track and treat children with observed tendencies toward homosexual 
object choice or other sex discordant behavior. See Sedgewick, supra note 44, at 18–19, 20; 
Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gen-
der,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 84–91 (1995) 
(parsing the interaction of sex, gender, and sexual orientation as separate categories). 
266 See Michael Janofsky, Gay Rights Battlefields Spread to Public Schools, N.Y. Times, June 9, 
2005, at A18 (“We’re concerned about the effort to capture youth through indoctrination 
 
2008] Irrational Exuberance About Babies 59 
against such tolerance to avoid frustration of their anticipated “capital 
returns” from reproduction.267 Surely, these parental preferences pre-
dated the birth of the child. 
 Many homosexuals raise children, sometimes their own but often, 
through adoption and foster care programs, the unwanted children of 
heterosexuals.268 Would a homosexual parent also preference hetero-
                                                                                                                      
into the homosexual lifestyle. Students are a captive audience, and they are being targeted 
by groups with that as an agenda.”) (quoting Mathew D. Staver, president and general 
counsel of Liberty Counsel, a “conservative group”); see also Nancy J. Knauer, Homosexuality 
as Contagion: From The Well of Loneliness to the Boy Scouts, 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 401, 404, 
468–82 (2000) (showing how a contagion model of homosexuality articulated in the 1920s 
continues to inform parental and other efforts to erase homosexuality from the experi-
ence of the young). See generally Nicolosi & Nicolosi, supra note 48. 
267 The constitutional status of religious claims makes them valuable to parents who 
want to safeguard their investment from the risk of homosexualization. For example, in 
Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., No. AW-05–1194, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8130, at *34–35 (S.D. Md. 2005), the Court issued a temporary restrain-
ing order against an eighth- and ninth-grade curriculum to which religious fundamental-
ists had objected because it noted that some fundamentalist religions are more likely to 
have negative attitudes about gays than other religions: 
Defendants open up the classroom to the subject of homosexuality, and spe-
cifically, the moral rightness of the homosexual lifestyle. However, the Revised 
Curriculum presents only one view on the subject—that homosexuality is a 
natural and morally correct lifestyle—to the exclusion of other perspec-
tives. . . . As such, the Court is deeply concerned that the Revised Curriculum 
violates Plaintiffs’ free speech rights under the First Amendment, and be-
lieves that Plaintiffs’ free speech allegations merit future and further investi-
gation. 
Id. (emphasis added to draw attention to the judge’s own bias). Such mobilizations against 
tolerance are common—and encouraged—among religious fundamentalists. See, for ex-
ample, Southern Baptist Convention, Resolution: On Educating Children (2005), 
http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=1142, a resolution adopted by the 
Southern Baptist Convention regarding homosexuality in schools: 
Whereas, Homosexual activists and their allies are devoting substantial re-
sources and using political power to promote the acceptance among school-
children of homosexuality as a morally legitimate lifestyle. . . . Whereas, Par-
ents have access to textbooks, curricula, special programs, teachers, and other 
school personnel, giving them tremendous power to effect change in 
schools. . . . Resolved, That we urge parents and churches to exercise their 
rights to investigate diligently the curricula, textbooks, and programs in our 
community schools and to demand discontinuation of offensive material and 
programs . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added to stress the similarity between judicial and religious vocabulary); see 
also Ron Barnett, Baptists’ Fears of Homosexuality in Curriculums Muted Here, Greenville 
News (S.C.), Sept. 26, 2005, at 15B (noting fundamentalist success in using public schools 
as mouthpieces for heteronormativity). 
268 See Gates, et al., supra note 6, at 8. By one estimate, over sixty-five thousand chil-
dren under eighteen live in a same-sex household. Id. at 8 (this figure also includes second 
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sexuality? Homosexuals might also derive social and symbolic value 
from having straight children. Public displays of heterosexuality pay 
instant dividends while displays of homosexuality (especially between 
males) may be met with negative reactions ranging from disapproval 
and shunning to physical violence and, in the most extreme cases, 
murder.269 Expanding on sociologist Erving Goffman’s work on identity 
management by members of stigmatized groups, Kenji Yoshino has 
noted that homosexuals play down their identity in order to reduce 
exposure to this type of hostility.270 For a gay or lesbian parent, then, 
having a child—especially a heterosexual one—may yield “covering 
value.” And this kind of social and symbolic income may be dearer to 
the homosexual parent than a straight one who is already awash in that 
type of social approval and other forms of symbolic capital. 
 Contra, one might expect homosexual parents to mimic their 
straight counterparts through projection of the parent’s identity, but 
this time a homosexual one. One could postulate a lesbian daughter 
preference, for instance, to mirror the heterosexual parent’s taste for 
                                                                                                                      
parent adoptions). Another fourteen thousand foster children also live in same-sex house-
holds. Id. at 15. 
269 In 2006, there were nearly fourteen hundred reports of hate crimes against gays, les-
bians, and other sexual minorities. Clarence Patton, National Coalition of Anti-
Violence Programs, Anti-Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Violence in 2006, at 
2 (2007), available at http://www.ncavp.org/common/document_files/Reports/2006Ntnl 
HVReportReleaseEdition.pdf. In 2006, fifty-five percent of the sexual minorities reporting 
hate crimes were male and twenty-eight percent were female. Id. at 10. Another thirteen per-
cent of the victims self-reported as “Transgendered male-to-female.” Id. I understand that 
category to mean that some if not most of those reporting were biological males, a conclu-
sion supported by official statistics. For example, although the 2006 statistics of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation were not yet available, for 2005 these statistics reported more than 
three times as many anti-gay incidents against male victims as female victims. See Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, Hate Crimes Statistics 2005, available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2005/ 
table1.htm. There is little reported about the specific incidents which trigger these incidents 
but, to a homophobe, physical expressions of same-sex affection would be more provocative 
than the mere existence of a gay or lesbian person. Some research has correlated homopho-
bia with personal discomfort with same-sex touching. See, e.g., Neal J. Roese et al., Same-Sex 
Touching Behavior: The Moderating Role of Homophobic Attitudes, 16 J. of Nonverbal Behav. 249 
(1992). In contrast, consider the pleasant surprise felt by this woman who, after decades as a 
lesbian, began expressing affection in public with a man: “‘Whenever we [two women] would 
hold hands in public, I felt . . . fear, waiting for the customary dirty looks or . . . looking-away.’ 
In place of revulsion, she was now greeted by strangers with approving smiles. ‘I felt suddenly 
acceptable and accepted and cute, as opposed to queer.’” Guy Trebly, A Kiss Too Far? N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 18, 2007, § 9, at 1. 
270 See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 Yale L.J. 769, 875–924 (2002) (analogizing from 
the dynamics of gay self-effacement through “covering” to other forms of subordination 
through assimilation based on sex and race). Gays and lesbians sometimes play down their 
identity to avoid the discomfort of regulatory attention from enforcers of straight suprem-
acy. See id. at 776, 849–63. 
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heterosexuality in children, although I have come across no argument 
for it.271 Or a homosexual parent might prefer a homosexual child to 
protect it from normative heterosexuality. However, social science re-
search goes out of its way to show that gay and lesbian parents do not 
“homosexualize” (my word) their offspring.272 The supplicant posture 
of this research is worth noting: it genuflects to the straight supremacist 
fear that gay and lesbian parents will mimic straight ones in reproduc-
ing parental preferences.273 It implicitly reveals the Catch-22 that gay 
parents must face: if being raised by gay parents increased the likeli-
hood of a child being gay, this would threaten the dominance of het-
erosexuality; but if children raised by sexual minorities are no more 
likely to be gay than those raised by straight ones, then this outcome 
also challenges heterosexual normativity by refuting the claim that only 
heterosexual parents can be trusted to reproduce heterosexuality. 
III. Implications 
 “So what?” you might say. It is one thing to know that, chances 
are, your child will be heterosexual or right-handed. It is another to 
desire it—with varying degrees of elasticity as suggested by the auc-
tion’s price points—and to cathect the outcome with meaning. The 
implications of this meaning are, of course, contestable; but let me 
suggest some provisional conclusions about the conceptual problems 
                                                                                                                      
271 I first presented this argument at a feminist conference in Finland on the politics of 
the philosophy of gender. A member of the audience associated with a Finnish political 
action group that advocated for homosexual parents objected to it on two grounds. First, 
lesbians could not afford to abort male fetuses because of the prohibitive cost of preg-
nancy. Second, lesbians benefited from having male babies because (and I hope that this 
ground involved unstated ambivalence about resting on Freud) it was their primary con-
tact with the penis. 
272 See, e.g., Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 15 Current Di-
rections Psychol. Sci. 241, 242 (2006). One study did find a statistically significant dif-
ference in the reported ability of children of homosexual parents to feel connection with 
people at school: they report feeling more connected than do their counterparts. Id. This 
result is particularly remarkable given the finding, corroborated by the hostility that many 
students who are themselves sexual minorities encounter in elementary and secondary 
schools, that the children of homosexuals may become targets of “anti-gay” sentiment from 
other students. Id. at 243. The studies that target sexual orientation, in part to test for a 
disproportionate prevalence of homosexuality in offspring, have not found a higher inci-
dence of homosexual offspring for homosexual parents. Charlotte J. Patterson et al., Chil-
dren of Lesbian and Gay Parents: Research, Law, and Policy, in Children and the Law: Social 
Science and Policy 1, 12 (Bette L. Bottoms et al., eds., 2000). 
273 Several lines of social science research have considered “whether the development 
of sexual identity might be compromised” in children raised by homosexual parents. Id. at 
11. 
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raised by the taste for heterosexuality. Section A concludes that it is a 
eugenic family preference, nodded to by cases like Morrison and Her-
nandez. Then, turning to the interests of heterosexuals, Section B 
urges more ex ante recognition of heterosexual ambivalence and re-
gret about coital reproduction, which would reduce the pressure be-
hind the taste for heterosexuality. 
A. Lifestyle Competition: Managing Eugenic Disappointment in the Family 
 The taste for heterosexuality in offspring is akin to (and similarly 
troubling as) the preference, in some cultures, for a son over a daugh-
ter.274 In this sense, it is one of the “eugenic concerns” which Martha 
Ertman sees in reproductive markets.275 In isolation and as part of an 
aggregate, the taste dynamically reproduces the very condition— 
conceptual liquidation of sexual minorities—that many would-be par-
ents use as a bootstrap justification for the taste.276 None of this is 
meant to suggest that parents are simple “perpetrators.” They suffer, 
too, and dearly. Normative heterosexuality has few winners once all 
the cards are on the table. 
 Michele Goodwin makes some feasible legal recommendations to 
mitigate marketized racism in the adoption market.277 Unlike law’s 
formal commitment to ending formal racism, however, the law pro-
motes heterosexuality, including through the regulation of marriage 
and childrearing.278 It would, therefore, be premature for me to rec-
ommend reforms to positive law. That said, a legal argument for pro-
tection from the taste could take the form of Bonnie Steinbock and 
Ron McClamrock’s argument for a “minimum birthright” for future 
children.279 Arguing that even future people have “interests,” Stein-
                                                                                                                      
274 See Schultz, supra note 72, at 386–87. Economic reasons are cited for this preference 
too: “[N]et economic productivity of boys may exceed that of girls . . . . [T]he remittance 
rate to parents from the economic productivity of boys and girls may differ such that the 
old age insurance value for parents of an investment in boys exceeds that of . . . girls.” Id. 
at 386. 
275 See Ertman, supra note 4, at 26–30. 
276 See Gabilondo, supra note 27, at 21–22. 
277 See Goodwin, supra note 4, at 75–79 (recommending price caps, taxation, and pub-
lic education to correct marketized racism). 
278 See supra notes 75–94 and accompanying text. 
279 See Bonnie Steinbock & Ron McClamrock, When Is Birth Unfair to the Child? Hast-
ings Ctr. Rep., Nov.–Dec. 1994, at 15, 15 (citing arguments made by Joel Feinberg). Using 
an approach to contingency familiar to property law, this stake in minimum birthrights is 
modeled after the concept of springing “future interests.” Id. The idea of springing inter-
ests protects contingent interests in a quality of life while avoiding a vested interest in com-
ing into existence at all: “The pre-conscious, presentient fetus has no actual interests, and 
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bock shows that people-in-being must consider the interests of future 
people.280 By analogy, future sexual minorities may be entitled to pro-
tection from heterosexuality offspring preference in parents-to-be. 
 In the meantime, it might behoove straight parents to take some 
cues from their same-sex counterparts. Doing so would contribute to 
the “symbolic subversion” which Bourdieu identifies as a key objective 
of the movement to resist the conceptual liquidation of sexual minori-
ties.281 Correctly, he notes that the “symbolic destruction” of the domi-
nant heterosexual order and the abolition of its underlying “principle 
of division” are the main objectives of any serious efforts on this is-
sue.282 
 One baby step which heterosexuals could take is some consistency 
in using the word “lifestyle,” which refers to a principle or taste underly-
                                                                                                                      
therefore cannot be harmed (or benefited). But on the assumption that the fetus will be 
born, we can ascribe to it certain ‘future interests’ which can be . . . defeated by actions 
done before the potential person becomes an actual person.” Id. See generally Maura Ryan, 
The Argument for Unlimited Procreative Liberty: A Feminist Critique, Hastings Ctr. Rep., July–
Aug. 1990, at 6, 7–9 (objecting to legal recognition of a parent’s property right in chil-
dren). 
280 See Bonnie Steinbock, Life Before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status of Em-
bryos and Fetuses 37 (1992) (applying an interest view of moral status to conscious indi-
viduals, nonconscious individuals, future people, and potential people, such as embryos 
and fetuses). Steinbock argues that future people have moral status because their interests 
are foreseeable now: 
If people today pollute the atmosphere and drinking water . . . and deplete natural 
resources, that is likely to have disastrous effects on the lives of those who come later. 
Their actual future interests will be harmed . . . because of our decisions today . . . . 
Because they have interests, future people qualify for moral status. 
Id. 
281 See Bourdieu, Masculine Domination, supra note 197, at 123. Bourdieu’s analysis of 
heterosexual power leaves something to be desired, mostly because it is so brief. The only 
extended discussion I could find about the “symbolic domination” which heterosexual power 
imposes on sexual minorities is in the Appendix to Masculine Domination. See id. 
282 See id. The irony of Bourdieu’s comment is that he does not account for the gap be-
tween the alleged strength of the gay and lesbian movement and the relatively modest 
progress it has made in symbolic subversion: 
[T]he gay and lesbian movement brings together individuals who, although 
stigmatized, are relatively privileged, especially in terms of cultural capital, 
which constitutes a considerable asset in their symbolic struggles. The objec-
tive of every movement committed to symbolic subversion is to perform a la-
bour of symbolic destruction and construction aimed at imposing new cate-
gories of perception and appreciation, so as to construct a group or, more 
radically, to destroy the very principle of division through which the stigmatiz-
ing group and the stigmatized group are produced. 
Id. at 123. Halley’s earlier analysis of the legal construction of heterosexuality is a good 
example of such an effort. See Halley, supra note 165, at 83. 
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ing a discretionary consumption choice. The word “lifestyle” persists as 
a somewhat crass (heteronormative) putdown of homosexuals, a good 
recent example of which is the holding in Lawrence v. Texas: “[The pre-
sent case] does not involve whether the government must give formal 
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. 
The case does involve two adults who . . . engaged in sexual practices 
common to a homosexual lifestyle.”283 To a homosexual, the word “life-
style” sounds—or ought to sound—just as “Negro” or “colored” would 
sound to an African-American. Justice Kennedy’s plainly conciliatory 
diction serves the important judicial function of projective denial by 
doing two things at once: first, it suggests that having a sexual orienta-
tion—a homosexual one, that is—is akin to choosing between Prada or 
Hugo Boss; second, it invites us to assume that when heterosexuals have 
a relationship it involves something other than a lifestyle. As Becker 
points out, however, having a baby is a lifestyle choice because it in-
volves acquiring a “consumption good.”284 Maybe heterosexuals need 
to be reminded more diligently on this point. 
 As the welcome borrowings by arriviste metrosexuals suggest, het-
erosexuals stand to gain from copying homosexuals, maybe in repro-
duction too. Sexual minority parents may socialize children differently 
from their heterosexual counterparts, hopefully by disapproving of the 
sex-based institutions which have been the bane of homosexual exis-
tence. Their own experience with animus, family coercion, and legal 
insult may give gay and lesbian parents a practical comparative advan-
tage at letting a young child develop organically along a standard based 
in fact—not just in law—on the child’s best interests, rather than the 
projective interests of the parents, as endorsed by third parties like 
courts. If feminist Dorothy Dinnerstein was right to blame cross-sex 
childrearing for patterned heterosexual malaise, then stopping the 
near-monopoly of these traditional family structures might not be such 
bad thing.285 Legal doctrine like Morrison and Hernandez, however, 
stunts heterosexual self-awareness by providing a pretext for not con-
sidering any serious lifestyle competition with gay and lesbian par-
                                                                                                                      
283 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (emphasis added to reflect value-laden 
terms that can serve as the textual bases for future cases); see also Franke, supra note 143 on 
the limits of Lawrence. 
284 See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
285 See Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrange-
ments and Human Malaise 10 (1977) (“The gathering impulse to break loose from our 
existing gender arrangements, to free ourselves from the fixed symbiotic patterns that 
have so far prevailed between [heterosexual] women and men, is part of the central thrust 
of our species’ life toward more viable forms.”). 
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ents.286 It does this by sanctioning (in the positive, not the negative, 
sense) heterosexual reproductive practices that deserve more scrutiny 
and, as the courts admit, mitigation.287 The effect is to preclude the 
need to imagine—and put into practice—better reproductive practices, 
much in the way that MacKinnon notes feminist conceptions of the 
state have been precluded.288 
B. The Wages of Coitus: Heterosexual Counterdemand 
 The more general problem, for the heterosexuals posited in Morri-
son and Hernandez, is how to escape the social conditions that can lead 
to a long and dreary cycle of reproductive regret. Were heterosexuals 
more aware up front of the “total effect” and costs of reproduction, 
they might better avoid the marriage-inducing accidents considered by 
Morrison and Hernandez.289 
 Here I offer a strategic essentialization of anti-natalist regret in the 
aggregate by introducing the idea of “counterdemand” for children.290 
Though one could express a similar idea in terms of the “excess supply” 
of children, counterdemand appropriately focuses on the holding 
preference of parents in the aggregate instead of on the supply of chil-
dren. Rather than conscious decisions that successfully eliminate the 
risks of pregnancy ex ante—such as contraception, avoidance of repro-
ductive sex, and voluntary sterilization—counterdemand refers to de-
                                                                                                                      
286 See supra notes 118–133 and accompanying text. 
287 See supra notes 118–133, 135–136 and accompanying text. 
288 MacKinnon, supra note 21, at 249. MacKinnon notes: “It will be said that feminist 
law cannot win and will not work. But this is premature. Its possibilities cannot be assessed 
in the abstract but must engage the world. A feminist theory of the state has barely been 
imagined; systematically, it has never been tried.” Id. 
289 Cf. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1, 44 (1960) (showing in 
the context of the law of nuisance that, absent transaction costs, allocating liability be-
tween two counterparties to a transaction makes no difference in allocative terms because 
the parties will negotiate in order to optimize the yield on the transaction). The useful 
phrase belongs to Coase: 
[W]e have to take into account the costs involved in operating the various social ar-
rangements (whether it be the working of a market or of a government depart-
ment), as well as the costs involved in moving to a new system. In devising and choos-
ing between social arrangements we should have regard for the total effect. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
290 See generally Van Praag & Warnaar, supra note 1, at 243. Considering the net effects of 
reproductive decisions is the essence of deliberative rationality on this point: “A child does 
not only generate household costs but revenues as well. . . . There is a calculus of cost and 
revenue behind it and in some sense we are only really interested in the balance.” See id. 
66 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 28:1 
sire (and attempts) to “back-track” from prior action that might not 
have been undertaken but for pro-natalist bias. 
 Counterdemand starts by adding up data that suggests some regret 
over or repudiation of the fact of pregnancy or birth: abortion, infanti-
cide, post-partum “disorders” in women, pregnancy denial, child abuse, 
pregnancy-related domestic violence, child abandonment, and the giv-
ing up of one’s child for adoption.291 In one sense, counterdemand 
would be one measure of time-inconsistency in reproduction. Even this 
interim measure, however, will understate counterdemand because it 
overlooks private parental regrets about reproduction which never rise 
to the level of a reportable incident. 
 As noted earlier, of each year’s roughly four million births, about 
1.3 million (33%) of them may represent unintended pregnancies not 
terminated.292 Approximately one million of these four million births 
involve premature birth, low birth weight, or birth defects (all factors 
which may impair a real baby’s quality of life), and over 450,000 of the 
total births are by teenage females arguably too young to appreciate 
how having a baby at that age impacts one’s life prospects.293 About 
240,000 pregnant women experience domestic abuse, with forty per-
cent of this abuse beginning during the couple’s first pregnancy.294 
Suggesting counterdemand on the part of fathers, pregnant women are 
at twice the risk of battery (presumably from partners) than non-
pregnant women.295 Many children suffer crimes, neglect, and other 
                                                                                                                      
291 See infra notes 292–310 and accompanying text. The statistics are silent as to 
whether parents with counterdemand are heterosexual or homosexual, although my intui-
tion is that heterosexual parents are dramatically overrepresented in any measure of coun-
terdemand (that is, the proportion of counterdemand attributable to heterosexuals ex-
ceeds the proportion of heterosexuals in the general population). A finding to that effect 
would vindicate the judicial arguments in Hernandez that opposite-sex couples need incen-
tives to promote the stability which same-sex parents are able to provide through their own 
self-regulation. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006). Nonetheless, as Chief 
Justice Kaye points out in her dissent, the majority fails to show how excluding homosexu-
als contributes to heterosexual stability. Id. at 27 (Kaye, J., dissenting) (“Correctly framed, 
the question before us is not whether the marriage statutes properly benefit those they are 
intended to benefit—any discriminatory classification does that—but whether there exists 
any legitimate basis for excluding those who are not covered by the law.”). 
292 See discussion supra note 17. My use of abortion statistics to support my argument 
does not involve any criticism of women who seek abortion. Quite the contrary: it is re-
markable that at least this many women manage to obtain abortions despite the legal and 
cultural obstacles. A more “abortion-friendly” legal system that provides people—especially 
the young—more options for managing their reproduction might reduce demand for 
“morning after” marriages in response to unintended pregnancy. 
293 Am. Pregnancy Ass’n, supra note 17. 
294 Id. 
295 Id. 
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misfortunes at the hands of their parents.296 Counterdemand should 
take into account some of this suffering by children because it may re-
flect parental frustration over contact with the realities of child-rearing. 
 Post-partum mood disorders and pregnancy denial may also in-
volve a form of counterdemand. As a formal matter, postpartum de-
pression refers only to post-natal mood disruptions which are more 
serious than the common “baby blues.”297 Even at this high threshold, 
however, it is frequent.298 Estimates of the frequency of post-partum 
                                                                                                                      
296 See Nat’l Ctr. on Child Abuse Prevention Res., Child Maltreatment: Reports, 
Victims, and Fatalities 1 (2007) [hereinafter Child Maltreatment], available at 
http://member.preventchildabuse.org/site/DocServer/Child_Maltreatment_Fact_Sheet_ 
2005.pdf?docID=221 (membership required). In 2005, state child abuse authorities substan-
tiated claims of child abuse and neglect for 899,000 children out of a pool of over 3.5 million 
children with respect to whom abuse allegations were brought. Id. In 2005, infanticide rates 
for children under five years of age stand at 2.2% for whites, 6.6% for blacks, and .07% for 
others. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Dept. of Justice, Homicide Trends in the U.S.: Infanticide, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/kidsratestab.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2008) 
[hereinafter DOJ, Infanticide]. Infanticide child abuse authorities believe that children with 
disabilities are more likely to be abused than other children. Nat’l Ctr. on Child Abuse 
Prevention Res., Fact Sheet: Maltreatment of Children with Disabilities, 1 (n.d.), 
http://member.preventchildabuse.org/site/DocServer/maltreatment. pdf?docID=124 (mem- 
bership required) (“Some researchers suggest that children with disabilities may have in-
creased vulnerability to abuse because of society’s response to the disability, rather than 
the disability itself. Children with disabilities may be perceived as less valuable than other 
children. Their reports may not be considered trustworthy. Discipline may be more puni-
tive and accompanied by a lack of respect.”(citations omitted)). Also in 2005, 1460 chil-
dren died of abuse and neglect. Child Maltreatment, supra, at 1. In 2005, federal au-
thorities also identified 556 homicides of children under five years of age. DOJ, Infanticide, 
supra. An additional 4500 infant deaths every year are attributed to Sudden Infant Death 
Syndrome, a residual category for otherwise unexplained deaths which, in some cases, may 
be associated with neglect.Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health and 
Human Servs., Sudden, Unexplained Infant Dealth Initiative (SUIDI): Overview, http:// 
www.cdc.gov/SIDS/SUID.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). 
297 Katherine L. Wisner, et. al., Postpartum Disorders, in Infanticide, supra note 198, at 
35, 41 (“Postpartum depression also must be distinguished from the ‘baby blues,’ which 
are very common and occur in 50%–80% of women. Symptoms, which peak on days 4–5 
postpartum, consist of a mild mood disturbance without the pervasive dysphoria character-
istic of major depression.”). 
298 See id. at 36. One study found that fourteen percent of women were experiencing a 
major mood disorder within three months after terminating or continuing a pregnancy to 
term; in the first month after birth, a woman is over twenty times more likely to develop 
psychosis than in the two years prior to the birth. Id. Abortion opponents sometimes note 
that some women who have abortions become depressed after doing so. Symptoms and 
Frequently Asked Questions About Post Abortion Stress Syndrome, http://afterabortion. 
com/faq.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2008) (discussing the controversy surrounding Post 
Abortion Stress Syndrome (PASS)). It is more accurate to note that, for some women, 
pregnancy—whether or not terminated—leads to depression. See Katherine L. Wisner, et. 
al., Postpartum Disorders, in Infanticide, supra note 198, at 35, 41. 
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depression range from ten to fifteen percent of all live births.299 Post-
partum psychosis affects far fewer women—between one in one thou-
sand and one in five hundred—but has consequences much more 
severe than depression.300 Pregnancy denial involves the refusal to 
admit that one is pregnant to oneself (or, perhaps, to one’s forbidding 
parents).301 Pregnancy denial often precedes neonaticide—the killing 
of an infant on the day of its birth.302 The baseline for pregnancy de-
nial is the absence of “the usual heightened emotional state of the 
pregnant woman that is associated with the process of early bond-
ing.”303 Not surprisingly, then, some feminists argue that law should 
revise thinking about infanticide by seeing it as involving a form of 
motherhood-as-suffering.304 
 Liquidating unwanted children is, of course, the ultimate expres-
sion of time-inconsistent regret in reproduction. As noted by Michelle 
Oberman, infanticide, perhaps contrary to popular belief, has been a 
constant through history.305 Deterrence based on legal punishment 
fails since infanticide tends to be “a spontaneous crime, reflecting a 
loss of control rather than a cool-headed calculation.”306 Indeed, 
Oberman notes that, given the circumstances in which many of these 
mothers find themselves, “on some occasions this terrible crime may 
be all but inevitable.”307 Law in the United States law is “remarkably 
                                                                                                                      
299 Postpartum Progress, http://postpartumprogress.typepad.com/weblog/2004/08/ 
by_the_numbers.html (Aug. 4, 2004) (comparing conservative estimate of annual inci-
dence of post-partum depression (400,000)—10% of 4,000,000 live births—with annual 
diagnoses of Parkinson’s disease (50,000), Alzheimer’s disease (250,000), multiple sclerosis 
(104,000), and diabetes (800,000)). 
300 See Nat’l Women’s Health Info. Ctr., U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 
Depression During and After Pregnancy: Frequently Asked Questions, 3 (2005), 
http://www.4woman.gov/faq/postpartum.pdf. For an interesting extrapolation comparing 
rates of post-partum depression in the United States with those in other countries, see 
WrongDiagnosis.com, Statistics by Country for Postpartum Psychosis, http://www.wrong 
diagnosis.com/p/postpartum_psychosis/stats-country.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). 
301 Laura J. Miller, Denial of Pregnancy, in Infanticide, supra note 198, at 81, 82–86. 
302 Id. at 81. 
303 Id. at 82. 
304 Id. at 129. 
305 Oberman, supra note 201, at 6–8 (noting that religious and legal efforts fail to 
eradicate the practice and tracing infanticide in ancient cultures, medieval Judeo-Christian 
society, Great Britain, and the United States); see also Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis 
in Law: An Introduction and Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1117, 1192–1200 
(1997) (situating the history and contemporary practice of human infanticide in the con-
text of evolutionary theory). 
306 See Oberman, supra note 201, at 14. 
307 Id. at 16. See generally Lucy Jane Lang, To Love the Babe That Milks Me: Infanticide and 
Reconceiving the Mother, 14 Colum. J. Gender & L. 114 (2005) (arguing that infanticide is a 
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inconsistent” and gives only limited recognition to “post-partum psy-
chosis” as a legal defense.308 This inconsistency reflects a failure to 
“recognize the profound similarities that underlie the many contem-
porary infanticide cases” and address them properly.309 
 Expressed as a rough ratio of supply (live births) to counterde-
mand, for every ten live births: three result from an unplanned preg-
nancy; two involve premature birth, low birth weight, or birth defects; 
one arises from a teenage pregnancy; one produces post-partum de-
pression; and two abortions occur, exposing women to the health risks 
of a quite invasive procedure. Even this primitive construction of coun-
terdemand suggests a more complex picture than patterned exuber-
ance about babies-as-ideas.310 Indeed, this is a more complete look at 
the heterosexual coitus than that used by Morrison and Hernandez as an 
anchor for their holdings. (And it bears noting that procreative mor-
bidity and mortality abroad, especially in developing countries, are 
much worse.)311 
 Because the mental organization of time bears directly on coun-
terdemand, more research about the time dynamics of reproduction 
would help. Behavioral research suggests that humans suffer from over-
optimism, tending to overvalue nearer states in time at the expense of 
later ones, a phenomenon called “hindsight bias.”312 Models for moral 
reasoning and microeconomics, however, have tended to understate 
the instability of many time preferences, perhaps because accounting 
                                                                                                                      
patterned reaction to suffering in women caused by social pressure to conform to ideals of 
motherhood). 
308 See Oberman, supra note 201, at 9. 
309 Id. at 14. 
310 Counterdemand would seem to be another aspect of Derek Parfit’s “repugnant 
conclusion” that, at the heart of reproductivism lies the principle that more unhappy lives 
are better than fewer happy ones. See generally Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 381–
87 (1984) (showing that total utility for a population can be increased by growing the 
population into a larger one in which members have a standard of living just marginally 
above an interest in nonexistence). Russell Jacoby has more recently noted that, for the 
conservative writers who push reproductivism, “the sanctity of life ends at birth; at least 
they show little interest in the suffering of the living.” Russell Jacoby, Excellent Writers, Facile 
Thinkers, Chron. Higher Educ. (Wash. D.C.), Feb. 2, 2007, at B13. 
311 Population Resource Ctr., World Health Day 2006, http://www.prcdc.org/ 
files/World_Health_Day_2006.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2008) (“Death and disability from 
maternal causes account for nearly twenty percent of the total disease for women of repro-
ductive age in developing countries.”). Women under the age of fifteen are five times 
more likely to die from childbirth than older women. Id. 
312 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 
1471, 1524–25 (1998) (noting that people underestimate the probability of bad outcomes 
to themselves compared with others). 
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for time-inconsistency makes economic models more complicated and 
limits the generalizability of their conclusions.313 Manuel Utset and 
others, however, have shown that many self-control problems actually 
reflect time-inconsistency.314 Reproduction (and sexual decision-
making generally) are good candidates for this type of analysis both 
because sex impulses have great potential to influence behavior and 
because the multiplier effects over time of reproductive and sexual de-
cisions are unusually significant. Pregnancy and child-rearing require 
the participants to plot their preferences over a period that may span 
two decades or longer. (One good legal approach to this reproductive 
reality is the enactment of states “safe haven” laws which make un-
wanted children “puttable” by establishing mechanisms to transfer un-
wanted infants and children.315 By reducing the exit costs of holding 
unwanted children, such laws make children more “liquid.”316) 
 Greater institutionalization of feminist methods in the economic 
study of reproduction might increase the contestability of dominant 
ideas about reproduction.317 Both a feminist economics and a feminist 
                                                                                                                      
313 John Rawls’s concept of deliberative rationality assumes time-consistency. “We are 
to see our life as one whole, the activities of one rational subject spread out in time. Mere 
temporal position, or distance from the present, is not a reason for favoring one moment 
over another.” See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 124 (1971). “One who rejects equally 
the claims of his future self and the interests of others is not only irresponsible with respect 
to them but in regard to his own person as well. He does not see himself as one enduring 
individual.” Id. at 423. 
314 See Utset, supra note 126, at 419–20. As noted earlier, some behavioral law and eco-
nomics research finds that people’s preferences are much less stable (or “time-consistent”) 
than previously thought. Id. Utset also notes how time-consistency in law imposes marginal 
but material costs on decision-making about abortion. See Manuel A. Utset, The Temporally 
Extended Family & Self-Control: An Essay for Lee E. Teitelbaum, 2006 Utah L. Rev. 107, 132–34 
(showing that legal decisions that improperly assume time-consistent behavior on the part 
of pregnant women may impose marginal costs on ending a pregnancy). 
315 Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 Colum. L. 
Rev. 753, 760 (2006) (using “moral panic” analysis to note the “snug and interesting fit 
between Safe Haven legislation and a culture whose politics are increasingly organized 
around the protection of unborn life”). 
316 See Becker, Fertility, supra note 1, at 227. Becker notes the illiquidity of children in 
the context of the preference for holding liquid assets (sometimes called a “flight to qual-
ity” in the bond world) during cyclical downturns in the economy and periods of eco-
nomic depression: “[S]ince children cannot be bought and sold they are a less ‘liquid’ 
asset than ordinary durables, and the economic uncertainty accompanying a depression 
would increase the community’s preference for liquid assets.” Id. He makes this point 
when considering reasons why the demand for children—as for any consumer durable— 
may decline during an economic depression. Id. at 223–27. 
317 In 2000, only fifteen percent of faculty in economics departments of Ph.D.-granting 
institutions were female. Marianne Ferber & Julie Nelson, Introdution to Feminist Eco-
nomics Today: Beyond Economic Man 1, 3 (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 
2003). In 2000, moreover, women made up only seven percent of the tenured economics 
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law and economics are emerging, much of which sounds in contract.318 
Some of it challenges the bright line distinctions in the rational actor 
model between open market relations and the economics of the fam-
ily.319 Parallel to these developments in feminist methods, behavioral 
law and economics has been maturing into a discipline, one that insists 
on more use in theory of inductive detail about real people.320 One 
source of such detail is games, including cooperation simulations like 
the ultimatum game, the stag hunt, and the prisoner’s dilemma, in ad-
dition to such exercises as the heterosexuality auction.321 Because this 
commitment to inductive detail creates an important opening for 
feminists, especially economically-minded ones, this article urges a 
marriage—or at least a civil union—between feminist methods and be-
havioral law and economics, the progeny of which could make repro-
ductive law and policy better reflect the realities of reproduction for 
women and others. 
                                                                                                                      
faculty. Id. Organizations such as the Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics 
Profession and the International Association for Feminist Economics have contributed to 
building professional networks, increasing the prominence of feminist research in profes-
sional economics journals, and incorporating feminist pedagogy in the economics class-
room. Id. at 2–29 (reviewing the incorporation of women’s and feminist perspectives in the 
economics profession). 
318 See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy 
the Gender Gap 82 Geo. L.J. 89, 104 (1993) (“If we instead focus our theoretical efforts on 
moving away from the altruistic model of the household, which assumes that a single be-
nevolent head makes household decisions, we may find ourselves at least initially on more 
solid footing. . . . Theorists can bring many of these tools to bear on the analysis of the 
family.”). See generally Darren Bush, Caught Between Scylla and Charybdis: Law & Economics as 
a Useful Tool for Feminist Legal Theorists, 7 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 395 (1999) 
(considering the relationship between feminist legal theory and a law and economics ap-
proach to unconscionability in contracts); Jeanne M. Dennis, The Lessons of Comparable 
Worth: A Feminist Vision of Law and Economic Theory, 4 UCLA Women’s L.J. 1(1993) (propos-
ing a feminist economics perspective based on theory and practice from which to analyze 
sex-based wage discrimination); Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From 
Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1235 (1998). 
319 See Paula England, Separate and Soluble Selves: Dichotomous Thinking in Economics, in 
Feminist Economics Today: Beyond Economic Man, supra note 317, at 33–59. Becker’s 
model assumes radically separate selves. Id. at 45–48. She criticizes this bright-line distinc-
tion as tending to underemphasize the range of separate preferences within the family. Id. 
at 43–50. 
320 See Jolls, supra note 312, at 1473. This research field purports to ask “How do ‘real 
people’ differ from homo economicus?” Id. at 1475–76. Jolls suggests three methodologi-
cal premises (bounded rationality, bounded self-control, and bounded self-interest) in 
order to produce “testable propositions” pending the ultimate resolution of the many 
philosophical questions involved. Id. at 1477. 
321 Id. at 1489–98. 
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 One example of useful work in this area is Molly Walker Wilson’s 
writing on surrogacy contracts. She suggests that surrogacy contracts 
should be voidable at law because would-be surrogates, when they exe-
cute these contracts, cannot appreciate how they may feel when it 
comes time to tender their baby to the counterparty, typically a wealth-
ier couple.322 She frames the problem of surrogacy contracts in the 
context of time-inconsistent behavior.323 She bases her claim on four 
features of human decision-making which vitiate meaningful consent to 
a surrogacy contract: the optimism bias, the endowment effect, the 
problem of market manipulation, and cognitive dissonance over time.324 
Wilson’s work does not support counterdemand but, rather, the more 
general claim that reproduction is prone to time-inconsistent decision 
making.325 The work by Utset and Wilson mines a new vein of insight 
about parental ambivalence about reproduction, but more is needed. 
Conclusion 
 This article was designed to intervene in some existing legal and 
socioeconomic conversations about reproduction and heterosexuality, 
ones in which economic logic mixes with other kinds of values. De-
                                                                                                                      
322 Molly J. Walker Wilson, Precommitment in Free-Market Procreation: Surrogacy, Commis-
sioned Adoption, and the Limits on Human Decision Making Capacity, 31 J. Legis. 329, 330–31 
(2005) (arguing that time-inconsistent preferences in women between gestation and birth 
militate against the enforcement of surrogacy contracts). 
323 See id. The underlying philosophical issue is whether “the self at Time 1 should be 
able to commit the self at Time 2 to a binding decision. . . . [W]ho is the real self, the Time 
1 self or the Time 2 self; and how much control should one self be able to exert over an-
other?” Id. at 334–35. This question has special relevance for reproduction. As one femi-
nist scholar, Mary O’Brien, has noted, the reproductive process actually involves three 
different types of time: “cyclical time, unilinear time and irregular episodicity.” Mary 
O’Brien, The Politics of Reproduction 61 (1981). She identifies ten different pivotal 
moments in heterosexual reproduction through coitus, each of which has a logic that does 
not fit easily into the type of discounting assumed by the time-consistent preferences in the 
rational actor model. See id. at 47. 
324 Wilson, supra note 322, at 336–42. 
325 Id. at 331. “[W]omen who enter surrogacy contracts can never truly give informed 
consent because there is no way that they can know before conceiving the child how they will 
feel about giving up the child once the time comes.” Id.(citation omitted). The dynamic 
which Wilson identifies is actually the opposite of counterdemand for children; in other 
words, surrogacy contracts suggest regret over a prior decision to surrender the infant in 
Period 1 when the mother’s holding preference in Period 2 has changed. Id. at 347 (“Com-
mentators who blithely assert that people only enter into contracts that are in their own best 
interests ignore evidence that in certain situations individuals make systematic errors in the 
process of decision making.”). Counterdemand also suggests time-inconsistency in reproduc-
tion but in the opposite direction: it is the decision to conceive that gives rise to the ambiva-
lence. See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
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spite welcoming their candor about heterosexual malaise, reading 
Morrison and Hernandez as a gay man means facing the sorts of “in-
sults” which cultural historian Didier Eribon has studied.326 On the 
bright side, outsider status makes possible clinical detachment which 
is useful for analysis. To echo Halperin’s distinction, homosexuality 
and its legal aspects are often over-studied and over-theorized as an 
“object”, rather than as a platform for generative insights.327 More in-
teresting is the heterosexual as a legal matter. So this article consid-
ered heterosexual reproduction and, more specifically, how prenatal 
tastes for heterosexuality in children may drive demand for children 
and inform how parents make sense of reproduction (or fail to do 
so). The issue matters not only to opponents of “gender cleansing” in 
children but also to those interested in how market mechanisms—like 
the adoption market Goodwin studied and the “when, if, and as-
issued” market from the heterosexuality auction—impact the family. 
 Let me recapitulate before concluding. Conceptual liquidation of 
homosexuals begins long before birth. The prenatal taste for hetero-
sexuality is inferable from parental reactions to children. Indeed, it 
may be strong enough to overcome the “taste for own children” which 
Becker considers the “distinguishing characteristic of families.”328 Re-
fining and pursuing one’s taste for heterosexuality in children follows 
from (and reenacts) a social and legal premium on heterosexuality 
and its reproduction. So the pill Posner imagines to inoculate chil-
dren against homosexuality (or, for that matter, prenatal diagnosis of 
homosexual tendencies in time to abort) makes sense as a strategy for 
turning the conceptual liquidation of sexual minorities into a liquida-
tion-in-fact.329 
                                                                                                                      
326 See generally Didier Eribon, Insult and the Making of the Gay Self (Michael 
Lucey trans., 2004) (1999). Didier Eribon shows how “insult” is the collective speech act 
that constitutes a gay person’s sense of self: 
Thus do gay people live in a world of insults. They are surrounded by a lan-
guage that hems them in and points them out. The world insults them; it 
speaks of them and of what is said about them. The words of day-to-day life as 
well as of psychiatric, political, and juridical discourse assign each of them in-
dividually and all of them collectively to an inferior place within the social or-
der. And yet this very language preceded them: the world of insults preexisted 
them, and it takes hold of them even before they know what they are. 
Id. at 56. 
327 See Halperin, supra note 184, at 60. 
328 See Becker, Family, supra note 1, at 45. 
329 See Robson, supra note 37, at 202. 
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 I used Bourdieu’s model of socially-constructed self-interest as the 
engine of social reproduction to suggest how the Ponzi scheme which 
Edelman describes stays in perpetual motion, in seeming stealth. By 
subsidizing heterosexual coitus with symbolic capital through marriage, 
Morrison and Hernandez make a market for the heterosexuality pre-
mium and, perhaps, become complicit in a long, dreary, and all too 
regenerative cycle of reproductive regret for some heterosexuals. To 
interrupt this form of reproductive praxis in law, sex, and conscious-
ness, I spoke at and about the legal doctrine without speaking from it, as 
it does not admit of special appearances to challenge its jurisdiction 
without thereby conceding it. 
 The structuralist premises underlying my argument would them-
selves predict that, essentially, it will fall on deaf ears as far as legal insti-
tutions are concerned; a contrary reaction would call into question the 
quality of my argument. Let me close by noting that my goal is not to 
encourage liberals, progressives, and others opposed to anti-gay animus 
to “cover” by denying what may be their taste for heterosexuality in 
children. Quite the contrary—arguments in favor of the taste for het-
erosexuality should be made and examined. What I do care about is 
encouraging some to think critically about their role as individuals in 
ideologies of reproduction through what has been called Bourdieu’s 
“sociology . . . as a form of therapy.”330 Doing so might help to cultivate 
a taste for the new, rather than for sameness. The benefits which Adri-
enne Rich promised feminists may be available more widely.331 If more 
heterosexuals did this kind of mental work, we might get to the point 
where—as Alexander Portnoy’s analyst tells him at the novel’s end—we 
can now begin.332 
                                                                                                                      
330 Michael Grenfell, Pierre Bourdieu Agent Provocateur 195 (2004) (putting 
Bourdieu’s intellectual production in a biographical context). 
331 See Rich, supra note 45, at 648. The possibilities for friendship which Adrienne Rich 
points out in the context of women apply more universally: 
To take the step of questioning heterosexuality as a ‘‘preference’’ or “choice” 
for women—and to do the intellectual and emotional work that follows—will 
call for a special quality of courage in heterosexually identified feminists but I 
think the rewards will be great: a freeing-up of thinking, the exploring of new 
paths, the shattering of another great silence, new clarity in personal relation-
ships. 
Id. 
332 Philip Roth, Portnoy’s Complaint 274 (Vintage 1994) (1967) (illustrating psy-
chic conflicts in integrating sexual impulses and upward mobility against the background 
of ethnic subordination as a Jew) (“So [said the doctor]. Now vee may perhaps to begin. 
Yes?”) (original brackets). 
